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THE ROLE OF “COORDINATING DISCOVERY
ATTORNEYS” IN MULTIDEFENDANT FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES
Hannah Silverman*
The twenty-first century’s technological revolution has shifted the practice
of law, including litigation, from being primarily paper-based to paperless.
To manage the increasingly complex organization and review of evidence in
civil and criminal cases, attorneys outsource legal tasks, work on teams, and
use discovery coordinators.
This Note examines the development of court-appointed coordinating
discovery attorneys and their role in multidefendant federal criminal trials
involving voluminous discovery. With a background in criminal defense and
electronic discovery, these lawyers provide hands-on assistance as a way to
cut costs, help overburdened and underfunded defense counsel, and improve
representation of criminal defendants. In 2014, however, one district court
judge denied the appointment of a coordinating discovery attorney, citing the
role’s seemingly insurmountable ethical complexities. Since then, no court
or legal scholar has studied how coordinating discovery attorneys can best
promote fairness and efficiency consistent with the ethics rules. After
examining how the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct apply to this role, this Note concludes that by carefully
circumscribing the role and establishing proper ground rules, coordinating
discovery attorneys can provide beneficial and substantive legal assistance
to multiple codefendants at once.
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INTRODUCTION
Even in the days where discovery in document-heavy cases was physical,
finding important documents was sometimes like searching for a needle in a
haystack.1 Since then, the volume of records has increased exponentially,
and the forms of discovery have become more complex.2 Now, lawyers
usually find the “smoking gun” in electronically stored information (ESI)—
sometimes in the minutia of metadata.3 Once an anomaly in discovery, ESI
is the new norm.
With these rapid technological changes, it is unrealistic to expect one
lawyer to collect, organize, and review every piece of documentary evidence
and discover the ones that matter.4 To help navigate these discovery
labyrinths, lawyers have turned to coordinators, consultants, contractors, and
1. Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
279, 303 (2005).
2. See DOUGLASS MITCHELL & SEAN BRODERICK, RECOMMENDED E-DISCOVERY
PRACTICES FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT CASES 1–2 (2009), https://
www.fd.org/sites/default/files/Litigation%20Support/recommended-e-discoverypractices.pdf [https://perma.cc/44P7-QKVP].
3. See id. at 3.
4. See id.
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outside experts. In class actions and multidistrict litigation, plaintiffs may
retain lead counsel or liaison counsel to streamline discovery efforts.5 In
high-volume white collar prosecutions, privately retained defense attorneys
may outsource their discovery review.6 In cases involving indigent
defendants, however, there is an imbalance between the government, with
seemingly limitless resources to investigate, organize, and review ESI, and
court-appointed defense attorneys, who often have few resources to
coordinate their efforts.7 This inequity places criminal defendants, especially
those unable to retain counsel, at risk of overlooking exculpatory evidence.8
Coordinating discovery attorneys (CDAs) play an increasingly popular
role in multidefendant federal criminal cases and have the potential to level
the playing field. Under contract with the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AOUSC), CDAs are criminal defense attorneys “who
have technological knowledge and experience, resources, and staff to
effectively manage complex ESI in multiple defendant cases.”9 In recent
years, CDAs have been recognized for offering court-appointed defense
attorneys in multidefendant cases a unique resource they would not otherwise
have: an additional attorney that, simply put, bears the burden of managing
discovery on behalf of all the defendants.10
CDA assistance on federal Criminal Justice Act of 196411 (CJA) cases
with voluminous electronic discovery eliminates duplicative and costly
efforts that would normally fall on the shoulders of the often underfunded

5. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).
6. Brandon James Fischer, Note, Outsourcing Legal Services, In-Sourcing Ethical
Issues: An Examination of the Ethical Considerations Arising from the Practice of
Outsourcing Legal Services Abroad, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 451, 459 (2010).
7. Letter from Sean Broderick, Nat’l Litig. Support Adm’r, Admin. Off. of U.S. Courts,
to CJA Study Comm. 2–3 (Feb. 19, 2016), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/hearingarchives/san-francisco-california/pdf/seanbrodericksan-franwrittentestimony-done.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KLA5-A4AL].
8. Daniel B. Garrie & Daniel K. Gelb, E-Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Need for
Specific Rules, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 400 (2010).
9. JOINT ELEC. TECH. WORKING GRP., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELECTRONICALLY STORED
INFORMATION (ESI) DISCOVERY PRODUCTION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, at Strategies, Page
11 (2012), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/Litigation%20Support/final-esi-protocol.pdf
[https://perma.cc/URF2-YL5Y] [hereinafter “ESI PROTOCOL”].
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
11. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012)).
Congress passed the CJA in 1964 to establish a method for appointing and compensating
attorneys who represent indigent defendants unable to retain counsel in federal criminal
proceedings. See generally id.; see also Defender Services, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services
[https://perma.cc/P5VF-49Y9]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019). In 1970, Congress amended the CJA, sanctioning districts to
establish federal defender organizations (FDOs) to serve as counterparts to federal prosecutors
and as a resource to appointed counsel who represent at least two hundred persons annually.
See Pub. L. No. 91-447, § 1, 84 Stat. 916, 916 (1970). Most attorneys that work with CDAs
are appointed pursuant to the CJA. See Direct Assistance for CJA Panel, DEF. SERVICES OFF.,
https://www.fd.org/litigation-support/direct-assistance-cja-panel
[https://perma.cc/8FZN4MXZ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
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defense attorneys.12 CDAs create a more cost-efficient and thorough
discovery process by allowing court-appointed counsel to focus on case
strategy rather than uploading, centralizing, and overseeing “millions of
discovery items.”13 Until Judge Katherine Forrest, then U.S. district judge
for the Southern District of New York, challenged the role’s ethical
implications in the 2014 decision United States v. Hernandez,14 CDAs
provided resource-constrained defense teams with the ability to lean on one
attorney with the necessary expertise to manage large document
productions.15 This Note explores whether Judge Forrest’s concerns are as
significant as she thought or whether CDAs can, in their limited role, serve a
more substantive purpose to enhance defendants’ quality of representation.
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information about ESI
and its effects on the discovery process in criminal cases. This Part also
describes how ESI’s increasing complexity has impacted the average
lawyer’s ability to thoroughly conduct discovery. This Part shows that these
technologically driven changes have influenced the creation and continued
need for CDA assistance. Part II traces the CDA’s role from 1993 to now,
highlighting one district judge’s refusal to appoint a CDA in light of ethical
concerns. This Part also discusses her decision’s impact on CDAs’
responsibilities. Part III explores the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) related to CDAs’
assistance on multidefendant federal criminal cases16 and concludes that any
ethics issues can be cured through informed consent, carefully created
ground rules, and judicial oversight.17
I. THE GROWTH OF ESI IN DISCOVERY: NEW PROBLEMS FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS AND A SOLUTION IN CDAS
Our daily technology consumption—and the extensive digital information
created as a result—continues to create new sources of discoverable ESI.
Part I.A first describes ESI and how its growth increasingly burdens criminal
defense attorneys as they prepare for trial. Part I.B then examines how this
burden necessitates teamwork—namely attorneys seeking outside help from
coordinators who have expertise in managing voluminous ESI. Finally, Part
12. ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9, at Recommendations, Page 1.
13. Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, Chair, Ad Hoc Comm. to
Review Criminal Justice Act Program 2 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/
default/files/hearing-archives/san-francisco-california/pdf/russaokisan-franwrittentestimonydone.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8UN-S44A].
14. No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
15. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
16. The Model Rules function only as a “national framework for implementation of
standards of professional conduct.” Tonia Lucio, Standards and Regulation of Professional
Conduct in Federal Practice, FED. LAW., July 2017, at 50, 52. Each federal court determines
its own standards of professional conduct—often applying the rules “adopted by the state in
which the federal court sits.” Id. at 51. Nonetheless, the Model Rules’ principles are “fairly
universal” and provide “useful guidance across jurisdictions.” Id. at 52.
17. While this Note analyzes the CDA’s role at the federal level, the analysis could apply
at the state level, provided that a state creates a similar role for multidefendant criminal cases.
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I.C introduces CDAs as a form of coordination and explains how the role
streamlines discovery processes and expedites defense counsels’ efforts in
multidefendant criminal trials.
A. An Overview on ESI
Our ever-growing use of electronics—cell phones, computers, thumb
drives, cloud computing, and the like—has swelled the amount of ESI in the
world.18 In 1996, only 5 percent of discoverable documents originated from
an electronic source.19 Now, over 90 percent of global communications are
generated electronically.20 By 2020, the amount of digital data is expected
to reach forty-four zettabytes, and the total “bits” in the digital universe will
surpass the number of stars in the physical universe.21
Due to the tremendous growth in digital data, discovery practice no longer
entails two parties exchanging paper documents.22 Criminal cases are no
exception to this shift.23 Because ESI grows in size and complexity each
year, managing and reviewing such evidence presents a significant challenge
for criminal defense attorneys.24 In one multidefendant federal criminal trial,
court-appointed counsel had to find a method to systematize and review
“240,000 images on 19 DVDs and CD Roms, an additional 185 banker boxes
of paper documents (approximately 460,000 pages), and 30 forensic images
18. See Andrew Jay Peck, Foreword, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2013); see also
Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal: Information Science Promises to Change the
World, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2014), http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-datais-a-big-deal [https://perma.cc/KDC6-5NYK] (“The data flow so fast that the total
accumulation of the past two years—a zettabyte—dwarfs the prior record of human
civilization.”).
19. Vlad J. Kroll, Note, Default Production of Electronically Stored Information Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Requirements of Rule 34(b), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 221,
221 (2007).
20. See The (2004) Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles
for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 151, 151 (2004).
21. See The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data & the Increasing Value of the
Internet of Things, EMC2 (Apr. 2014), https://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idcdigital-universe-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ49-VAG2].
22. See Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 821, 840 (2018).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, No. 13–CR–83S, 2015 WL 6696484, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2015) (noting that as technology becomes more widespread, the
government inevitably will produce more ESI as the original source of evidence); see also
Daniel B. Garrie et al., “Criminal Cases Gone Paperless”: Hanging with the Wrong Crowd,
47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 521, 522 (2010). The court in Quinones emphasized that collecting
“thousands of hours of continuous video footage is an example of discovery not possible as
recently as 10–15 years ago, because the recording and storage technology either did not exist
yet or was prohibitively expensive.” Quinones, 2015 WL 6696484, at *2.
24. See MITCHELL & BRODERICK, supra note 2, at 1–2. The ESI produced in criminal
proceedings usually includes some or all of the following material: (1) investigative materials,
(2) witness statements, (3) documentation of tangible objects, (4) third parties’ digital devices,
(5) photographs and video/audio recordings, (6) Title III wiretap information, (7) court
records, (8) tests and examinations, (9) expert material, (10) immunity and plea agreements,
and (11) discovery material with special production considerations, like child pornography or
trade secrets. See ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9, at Strategies, Pages 1–2.
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of computers, servers and thumb drives which held approximately 4.3
terabytes of data.”25 Collecting, processing, and analyzing this mass of data
is a daunting undertaking.26
Legal scholars, particularly judges, have expressed that this rise in ESI
challenges effective representation.27 Federal judges have observed that the
average lawyer lacks the legal and technical expertise to advise their clients
about the ESI affecting their cases.28 One judge remarked that the majority
of attorneys “have significant gaps in their understanding of e-discovery
principles.”29 Nonetheless, practitioners recognize that this new reality
cannot be ignored, and effective advocacy requires adapting to technological
advances.30
Especially in criminal cases, ESI can play a uniquely important role.31
Unlike hard copy documents and tangible evidence, like guns or clothing,
ESI may contain evidence that the prosecution—the custodian of the
evidence—may not realize is exculpatory.32 Because the criminal justice
system lacks the procedural tools that provide criminal defendants with
prompt access to ESI, defense attorneys must be prepared to request ESI from
the prosecution or convince the court that the exchange of ESI is required to

25. See MITCHELL & BRODERICK, supra note 2, at 2. “The reality is that in 2018,
‘document dumps’ are no longer relegated to white collar and/or corporate cases.
Increasingly, large quantities of discovery are turned over in a wide variety of matters
involving individual defendants.” Drew Findling, From the President: Unable to Bear the
Weight of the ‘Document Dump’: A Heavy Burden on Individuals, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF.
LAW. 5, https://www.nacdl.org/Article/September-October2018-FromthePresidentUnableto
Bear [https://perma.cc/77Y3-B3ST] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
26. See MITCHELL & BRODERICK, supra note 2, at 2.
27. See, e.g., Aebra Coe, Judges Lack Faith in Attys’ E-Discovery Skills, Survey Says,
LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/751961/judges-lack-faith-in-attyse-discovery-skills-survey-says [https://perma.cc/EU7E-V35W].
28. Id. (“Disruptive change is needed if lawyers are to become e-discovery competent.”).
29. Id.
30. Samantha V. Ettari & Noah Hertz-Bunzl, Ethical E-Discovery: Core Competencies
for New York Lawyers, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=66677 [https://perma.cc/F3R8-UWM6].
31. See, e.g., Garrie et al., supra note 23, at 523.
32. Id. This is significant because prosecutors are required to provide the defendant with
any evidence in the prosecution’s possession that tends to negate the defendant’s guilt. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (holding that prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence constitutes a due process violation).
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mount a full and fair defense.33 The Federal Judicial Center34 has asserted
that “[d]efense counsel’s effectiveness may depend on whether he or she has
reviewed and understands the e-discovery in time to enter into informed plea
negotiations.”35
The dramatic increase and complexity of ESI has made the discovery
process exorbitantly expensive.36 The RAND Institute for Civil Justice
reported that, in 2012, costs of reviewing discovery material contributed 70
percent or more to the total costs of document production in over 50 percent
of reported cases.37 Assuming billable rates for law firm associates average
between $200 and $500 per hour, the cost to review one gigabyte of data can
exceed $30,000.38 Often, civil attorneys delegate discovery tasks to
temporary contract attorneys, costing about $40 to $70 per hour, and up to
$300 for a higher-priced firm to review.39 In the criminal context, while all
defendants are entitled to build a defense, not all have the resources to
employ e-discovery vendors or contract attorneys to help streamline review
efforts.40
As long as technology continues to control how humans communicate and
how evidence develops, criminal defendants will seek ESI from the
33. See, e.g., Garrie et al., supra note 23, at 523. Nina Morrison, a senior staff attorney at
the Innocence Project, observed that the self-enforcing and subjective nature of Brady
productions is problematic because the rule demands “prosecutors who are competitive to do
something that can harm their chances to win a case.” J. Brian Charles, More States Forcing
Prosecutors to Hand Over Evidence—Even When It Hurts Their Case, GOVERNING (Apr. 20,
2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-criminaljustice-reform-brady-evidence-lc.html [https://perma.cc/TQ3M-FTHK].
In light of
prosecutorial subjectivity, some states have strengthened Brady’s protections. Id. Since 2004,
Ohio, North Carolina, and Texas have all adopted “open-file” reforms, permitting both the
prosecution and defense to examine any and all files possessed by law enforcement agencies,
felony investigators, and/or prosecutors. Id. In 2018, New York state judges began ordering
prosecutors to give the defense not only evidence that may be favorable to the defense but also
to affirmatively seek exculpatory information from law enforcement. Id. Efforts to reform
Brady at the federal level, however, have been unsuccessful. Id.
34. The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education agency of the federal
judiciary. About the FJC, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/about [https://perma.cc/ZP7QYX8V] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
35. See SEAN BRODERICK ET AL., CRIMINAL E-DISCOVERY: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES
3
(2015),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Criminal%20e-Discovery.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WCW-2GTJ]; see also Garrie & Gelb, supra note 8, at 394 (“Criminal
defense lawyers are as obligated as their civil law brethren to be conversant with electronic
discovery and its various attendant forms of electronically stored information in order to
effectively represent their clients.”).
36. See Endo, supra note 22, at 840.
37. NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY 41 (2012), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/
RAND_MG1208.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T74-JDAF].
38. See The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search &
Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 220 (2014).
“[A]ssuming one gigabyte equals 80,000 pages and assuming that an associate billing $200
per hour can review 50 documents per hour at 10 pages in length, such a review would take
160 hours at $200/hr., or approximately $32,000.” Id. at 229 n.18.
39. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 37, at 26.
40. Garrie & Gelb, supra note 8, at 402–03.
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government and third parties to understand the strength of the case against
them.41 Defense attorneys who fail to request and review ESI risk breaching
their ethical responsibilities42 and depriving their clients of an adequate
defense.43 While finding, organizing, and reviewing ESI is a cost issue in
both criminal and civil proceedings, the failure to manage ESI effectively in
a criminal matter may result in a defendant’s loss of liberty.44
B. Complex Discovery and the Demand for Coordination
Decades before ESI was a relevant topic, the legal field instituted costeffective measures to confront intricate cases on trial dockets.45 The Manual
for Complex Litigation (the “Manual”), first published in 1969, has become
an important resource that guides judges and lawyers in their management of
class action suits and multidistrict litigation (MDL).46 The Manual
recognizes that in complex cases with multiple parties and extensive
discovery, conventional procedures—where every attorney on the case
receives and reviews all the evidence, files and argues motions, and examines
witnesses—are prohibitively wasteful and burdensome to both the parties
and the court.47
To reduce this burden, the Manual encourages attorneys to coordinate their
efforts, or the court to authorize one or more attorneys to handle particular
aspects of the litigation on behalf of other counsel and their clients.48 Lead
counsel, for example, may be charged with drafting and presenting
arguments on substantive and procedural matters, working with opposing
counsel to create and implement a litigation plan, organizing discovery
41. See id. at 402.
42. The Model Rules implicitly acknowledge an attorney’s duty to investigate the facts
and circumstances relating to his or her client’s case. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
3.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“What is required of lawyers . . . is that they inform
themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that
they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions.”). The ABA’s
Defense Function Standards set a clearer obligation on criminal defense lawyers. See, e.g.,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.1(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(directing criminal defense counsel to undertake a prompt investigation, including “efforts to
secure relevant information in the possession of the prosecution, law enforcement authorities,
and others, as well as independent investigation”).
43. Garrie & Gelb, supra note 8, at 402–03.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Christine Durham, Taming the “Monster Case”: Management of Complex
Litigation, 4 LAW & INEQ. 123, 124 (1986) (“Fair and efficient resolution of complex litigation
depends upon . . . the collaboration of the judge and the attorneys in developing,
implementing, and monitoring a positive plan for the conduct of pretrial and trial
proceedings.”).
46. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 5. Chief Justice Earl
Warren first created the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States
Districts Courts to coordinate discovery among large-scale antitrust cases. See Martin H.
Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process,
and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 123 (2015). Chief Justice
Warren’s project was successful and later codified. Id.
47. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 10.22.
48. See id.
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requests and responses, examining deponents, and employing experts on
behalf of other counsel.49 And liaison counsel may be charged with
administrative tasks, such as receiving and distributing orders, motions, and
briefs, convening meetings of counsel, managing document depositories, and
resolving scheduling conflicts for a team of attorneys.50 Delegating and
streamlining these various responsibilities improves the flow of litigation
without risking fairness to the parties.51
Joint defense groups and judicial recognition of the joint defense
privilege52 exemplify how judges encourage attorneys to coordinate, among
other things, ESI. Joint defense groups enable codefendants to share the
weight of preparing for trial, including researching common legal issues,
preparing motions, writing briefs, reviewing evidence, and developing
strategy.53 Further, teams can split the costs of experts, consultants, and
third-party vendors, as well as the costs involved with creating and managing
discovery databases.54 Coordinating labor and pooling expenses between
codefendants allows defense counsel to review the government’s case more
thoroughly while minimizing litigation expenses on the parties and the
court.55
C. CDAs: The New Coordinators
CDAs are similar to these other modes of coordination. Mindful of both
the “overburdened criminal docket” and “the enormous burdens posed on the
courts and lawyers by complex criminal cases,” Judge Jack Weinstein, senior
U.S. district judge for the Eastern District of New York, first appointed
“administrative coordinating counsel” in related multidefendant criminal
prosecutions.56 Years later, the Joint Electronic Technology Working Group
(JETWG)57 formalized the role when drafting its Recommendations for
Electronically Stored Information (ESI) Discovery Production in Federal
49. See id. § 10.221.
50. See id. Other examples of coordinating roles in MDL include special masters, trial
counsel, issue committees, and steering committees. See Redish & Karaba, supra note 46, at
123.
51. See Redish & Karaba, supra note 46, at 123.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1467 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that the “common interest” or “joint defense” doctrine “generally allows a defendant to assert
the attorney-client privilege to protect his statements made in confidence not to his own
lawyer, but to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to the defense of
both” (quoting United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 701 (7th Cir. 1985))).
53. Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 871, 882 (1996).
54. Bradley C. Nahrstadt & W. Brandon Rogers, In Unity There Is Strength: The
Advantages (and Disadvantages) of Joint Defense Groups, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 29, 29 (2013).
55. Bartel, supra note 53, at 885.
56. United States v. Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. 962, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
57. The Director of the AOUSC and the U.S. attorney general established the JETWG in
1998 to develop and recommend best practices for ESI discovery in federal criminal cases.
See ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9, at Introduction, Page 1. The group consists of
representatives from the Defender Services Office (DSO), the Department of Justice (DOJ),
FDOs, private CJA attorneys, and liaisons from the federal judiciary and other AOUSC
offices. Id.
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Criminal Cases (the “ESI Protocol”) in 2012.58 The JETWG specified that
CDAs are criminal defense attorneys who are well versed in managing large
volumes of ESI to improve review strategies in multiple defendant criminal
cases.59 Once appointed on a multidefendant federal criminal matter, CDAs
address the timing and format of discovery productions, identify potential
discovery issues, and help maintain the discovery material’s evidentiary
integrity.60 CDAs’ responsibilities carry significant advantages for the
parties, defense counsel, and the court: for example, CDAs (1) ensure
discovery productions are provided to defense counsel in a timely and useful
form, (2) assess defense counsels’ litigation support needs and find the
resources to meet them, (3) organize discovery material in the most efficient
and effective fashion, (4) lower the costs of litigation support software,
hardware, and third-party services, and (5) eliminate duplicative work.61
While the CDA’s role has changed over the last few decades, there is little
literature investigating the value of the role, either in its original or current
form. Despite one judge’s sense that the role engenders ethics issues, this
Note argues that a more “unleashed” CDA is not only ethically sound but
also advances the goals at the core of the Model Rules.
II. CDA TIMELINE
This Part illustrates how CDAs have changed over time. Part II.A traces
the role’s decades-old underpinnings in Judge Weinstein’s courtroom to a
new stage before Judge Marsha Pechman, senior U.S. district judge for the
Western District of Washington. Part II.A also describes how the JETWG’s
ESI Protocol formalized and nationalized the previously regional CDA. As
the climactic moment in this Note’s “story,” Part II.B examines Judge
Forrest’s 2014 decision62 to reject the appointment of a CDA and explores
defense counsels’ motion to reconsider Judge Forrest’s decision. Finally,
Part II.C describes how Judge Forrest’s decision narrowed the CDA’s scope
moving forward.
A. Pre-Hernandez
The CDA’s evolution has been anything but static. This section follows
the role’s transformation from 1993 to 2014. Part II.A.1 first describes Judge
Weinstein’s innovative idea to appoint coordinating counsel, attorney
Eleanor Jackson Piel, in related multidefendant criminal cases. This section
also describes Ms. Piel’s impact on the case’s outcome. Part II.A.2 addresses
58. Id.
59. Id. at Strategies, Page 11.
60. Memorandum from Sean Broderick, Nat’l Litig. Support Adm’r, Admin. Off. of U.S.
Courts, to Fed. Pub./Cmty. Defs. & Panel Attorney Dist. Representatives 1 (June 11, 2018),
https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/litigation_support/2018-06-11-cda-announcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4C6K-SA2B] [hereinafter Memorandum from Sean Broderick].
61. Id. at 2.
62. United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2014).
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Judge Pechman and attorney Russell Aoki’s reimagination of the role in a
2003 fraud prosecution. Next, Part II.A.3 explores the JETWG’s ESI
Protocol, detailing the various recommendations that defense counsel should
take when managing complex cases with voluminous ESI, including
appointing CDAs. Finally, Part II.A.4 analyzes the orders to appoint CDAs
from 2012 to 2014, highlighting the broad role visualized prior to Judge
Forrest’s impactful decision.
1. 1993: Judge Weinstein’s Model
In 1993, Judge Weinstein first appointed “administrative coordinating
counsel” in United States v. Mosquera,63 a multidefendant narcotics and
money laundering prosecution. As a “pilot project” pursuant to section
3006A(a) of the CJA,64 Judge Weinstein found that the eighteen Spanishspeaking defendants, the corresponding number of lawyers, and the
burdensome discovery—including roughly 10,000 documents, 550 tape
recordings, and document translations—warranted the appointment of a
coordinating attorney.65 The court observed that its authority to maintain an
efficient docket and a broad reading of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure—“construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay”—
further justified the appointment for good cause.66
With Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in mind,67 Judge
Weinstein assured that this coordinating attorney would not infringe on any
one defendant’s right to loyal and zealous counsel.68 In fact, Judge Weinstein
rejected the recommendation of the Judges’ Manual for the Management of
Complex Criminal Jury Trials to select one defense attorney on the case to

63. 813 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2012) (authorizing the court to furnish “investigative,
expert, and other services necessary for adequate representation”).
65. See Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. at 967.
66. Id. at 966–68. Judge Weinstein presented the statistics behind what he called an
“exploding criminal docket”: between 1991 and 1992, there was a 14.8 percent increase in
criminal filings and an 11.5 percent increase in the number of criminal defendants in the
Eastern District of New York. Id. at 965. Today, the federal docket remains congested. While
there was only a 0.6 percent increase in criminal filings and a 7.3 percent decline in the number
of criminal defendants in the Eastern District of New York between 2017 and 2018, nationally,
statistics showed an 8.7 percent increase in criminal filings and a 7.5 percent increase in the
number of criminal defendants over that same time period. Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics 2018 Tables, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2018-tables [https://perma.cc/DKD3-EW6V] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (Scroll
down to “U.S. District Courts—Criminal,” follow hyperlinks to “Criminal Defendants Filed,
Terminated, and Pending (Including Transfers)” and “Criminal Cases Filed, Terminated, and
Pending (Including Transfers)” and download data tables.).
67. “[T]he court must take appropriate measures to protect each defendant’s right to
counsel.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2). Judge Weinstein underscored that Rule 44 implores
judges to “ensure that no conflicts of interest arise where two or more defendants are
represented by the same counsel.” See Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. at 967.
68. See Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. at 967 (“Such coordination will not impinge on the right
of each defendant to independent counsel and full individual due process.”).
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act as lead counsel for the defense as a whole.69 Especially in drug cases
where the lead defendant may use his or her control to disadvantage the other
codefendants, Judge Weinstein decided that appointing an attorney of record
to act as the coordinator for the group could lead to conflicts of interest.70
Judge Weinstein found, however, that an independent coordinator, who is
“limited to ensuring the smooth administration of the case and the
coordination of efforts among defense counsel,” can avoid conflicts and act
“consistent[ly] with due process.”71
To that end, the court appointed Eleanor Jackson Piel as coordinating
counsel, specifying that she would not represent any one particular defendant
and instead would act “for the defense” universally.72 Judge Weinstein
further clarified that Ms. Piel’s role would be limited: she could not negotiate
plea deals between any defendant and the government, appear on substantive
or procedural motion, communicate ex parte with the court, or advise any
defendant or attorney of record directly.73 The court authorized Ms. Piel to,
among other things, (1) coordinate communications with the court and the
government,74 (2) use computers or other technological means to expedite
the organization and review of discovery, (3) locate discovery material
relating to individual defendants, (4) make evidence accessible to defense
counsel and defendants, (5) retain paraprofessionals to perform documentrelated tasks, (6) obtain interpreters, (6) arrange and host meetings for
defense counsel, and, more generally, (7) “take such further action as will
assist the court and defense counsel in expediting the case and providing due
process at the least possible cost to the government.”75 Judge Weinstein also
emphasized that each defendant consented to the appointment of the
discovery coordinator with the understanding that this attorney would
provide administrative rather than legal assistance and that each defendant’s
attorney would retain sole representational obligations.76
According to Ms. Piel’s postlitigation report,77 Mosquera ended one year
later in two dismissals and guilty pleas for the remaining defendants.78 In
her report, Ms. Piel stated that without her aid, the expedited outcome—a

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. The court permitted the coordinator to liaise with the government on administrative
matters only, unless all defense counsel requested otherwise. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Report of Coordinating Counsel to the Court, United States v. Mosquera, No. CR 92–
1228 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1994), 1994 WL 593977, at *1.
78. Id. The court appointed Professor Gerard D. Lynch to review Ms. Piel’s report and
determine whether her role in Mosquera would be valuable in future complex federal criminal
cases. See id. Presently, courts do not ask CDAs to submit a report at the end of a case, though
some judges nonetheless request progress updates throughout the trial. See, e.g., Order at 3,
United States v. Benzer, No. 13-Cr-18 (D. Nev. Aug. 7, 2015), ECF No. 732 (listing the
twenty-five sealed status reports filed by the CDA, Mr. Aoki).
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global plea within one year—would not have occurred.79 She concluded that
the appointment of a coordinating attorney would benefit similar
multidefendant cases in the future, noting that “[t]he aid of a coordinating
counsel permits an advocate to operate on behalf of the defendants with no
risk to any one defendant’s case, thus fortifying the independence of each of
the defense counsel.”80
Ms. Piel’s report identified several tasks that helped the defense team
secure a quick resolution.81 Throughout the pretrial process, Ms. Piel
repeatedly requested discovery from the government through phone calls,
letters, and motions.82 She underscored that her ability to press the
government for evidence took significant pressure off the attorneys of record
since she could “make demands . . . without fear of recrimination in acting
on behalf of all the defendants and their counsel.”83 Moreover, because the
global plea’s terms involved a substantial downward modification from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, defense counsel relied on Ms. Piel to
determine whether the court could legally impose a sentence below the
guidelines’ range.84 Ms. Piel also assisted the defense attorneys with
formulating their sentencing arguments to the court.85
Although these tasks surpassed “administrative assistance” as defined in
Judge Weinstein’s order,86 Ms. Piel’s contributions “equalize[d] the equation
and enforce[d] the underlying concept of ‘due process of law.’”87 Without
impinging on any defendant’s right to zealous and loyal counsel, Ms. Piel
“expedite[d] the proceedings and . . . coordinate[d] matters which might
otherwise take up valuable court time.”88 Despite this successful “pilot
project” that benefitted the defendants, the government, and the court,89 few
district courts followed this case’s precedent.90
79. See Report of Coordinating Counsel to the Court, supra note 77, at *15 (“There is no
doubt in my mind that my functioning in this case contributed to a conclusion which occurred
more rapidly than it otherwise might have occurred had there been no coordinating counsel.”).
80. See id. at *16.
81. See id. at *17–19.
82. See id. at *17. In one letter to the government, Ms. Piel wrote, “[w]ith regard to
discovery under FRCP Rule 16(a)(1)(A), this is a request that you turn over to each of the
defense counsel a list of all conversations attributed to each individual defendant.” Id. at *6.
Unless Ms. Piel received authority from all defense counsel, such communication with the
prosecution surpassed Judge Weinstein’s order granting Ms. Piel the ability to “coordinate
communication with the government on administrative matters only.” United States v.
Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. 962, 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
83. Report of Coordinating Counsel to the Court, supra note 77, at *16.
84. Id. at *14.
85. See id. Ms. Piel convinced the attorneys of record to brief and argue the issue to
persuade the court that departing from the guidelines was both judicially desirable and
consistent with the sentencing guidelines’ purpose. See id.
86. Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. at 968.
87. Report of Coordinating Counsel to the Court, supra note 77, at *16.
88. Id. at *1.
89. See id.
90. But see, e.g., Order, United States v. Stephenson, No. 93-CR-157 (D. Conn. Dec. 10,
1993), ECF No. 330 (appointing Jeremiah Donovan as administrative coordinating counsel
for the defense); Pre-Trial Conference, United States v. Felipe, No. 94-CR-395 (S.D.N.Y. July
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2. 2005: Reemergence of Coordinating Attorneys in Federal Criminal
Trials
Appointing CDAs in their current form began with the help of Judge
Pechman and Washington attorney Russell M. Aoki.91 In 2003, Judge
Pechman presided over a $92 million securities fraud prosecution against
Kevin Lawrence and his health and fitness company, Znetix.92 The
discovery material included nearly 1.5 million pages of scanned
documents.93 This high volume of ESI caused logistical problems for both
the parties and the court.94 In 2005, after the trial had concluded, Judge
Pechman convened a group of Defender Services Office (DSO) attorneys and
the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Washington to discuss more
efficient and cost-effective methods to manage ESI in large criminal cases.95
This group included Mr. Aoki, then the CJA Panel attorney appointed to
represent Mr. Lawrence.96
Under Judge Pechman’s stewardship, Mr. Aoki helped draft “best
practices policies,” a set of recommendations created to ensure efficient
management of cases with voluminous ESI.97 To implement the policies and
develop new techniques to assist criminal defense attorneys in complex
cases, the district court began appointing Mr. Aoki as a CDA in 2005.98 In
2011, after this program’s success in Washington, the DSO contracted with
Mr. Aoki to provide the same services across the country.99
3. 2012: JETWG’s Formal Recommendation to Appoint CDAs
Recognizing CDAs’ success in Washington and attorneys’ inexperience
with ESI in criminal cases, the JETWG published the ESI Protocol in
2012.100 While nonbinding, the ESI Protocol endorses a set of procedures to
8, 1994), ECF No. 53 (designating the case as unusual and complex and discussing the
appointment of administrative coordinating counsel).
91. Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note 13, at 1.
92. See generally United States v. Lawrence, No. 02-cr-00260-MJP (W.D. Wash. Nov.
25, 2003).
93. See Tom O’Connor, Understanding eDiscovery in Criminal Cases: eDiscovery Best
Practices, EDISCOVERY DAILY BLOG (Jan. 15, 2018), https://ediscovery.co/
ediscoverydaily/electronic-discovery/understanding-ediscovery-criminal-cases-ediscoverybest-practices [https://perma.cc/M6NT-99JD]; see also Declaration of Russell M. Aoki in
Support of Defendant Omar Latson’s Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Coordinating
Discovery Attorney Russell M. Aoki at 3, United States v. Washington, No. 16-cr-06125
(W.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016), ECF No. 48 [hereinafter Aoki Declaration].
94. See O’Connor, supra note 93.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note 13, at 1.
98. Id.; see also Aoki Declaration, supra note 93, at 4.
99. Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note 13, at 1 (“I have
been appointed by U.S. District Courts over 60 times.”).
100. See generally ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9. The ESI Protocol contains an
introduction, the recommendations themselves, commentary that addresses technical and
logistical issues in more detail, and an “ESI Discovery Production Checklist.” See generally
ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9. The ESI Protocol’s “[r]ecommendations are designed to
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govern the production and management of ESI.101 Guided by common law,
local rules, and the experiences of veteran prosecutors and defense counsel,
the ESI Protocol “provide[s] courts and litigants with . . . concrete strategies
for improving efficiency, minimizing expense, increasing security, and
decreasing frustration and litigation.”102
The ESI Protocol explains that ESI, while complicated, opens the door to
greater efficiencies and cost-saving opportunities within the criminal justice
system.103 To realize these benefits, criminal attorneys must educate
themselves and employ the best practices for managing e-discovery in
multidefendant cases.104 One best practice in criminal cases with
voluminous ESI is to request the appointment of a CDA to streamline the ediscovery process.105 In February 2016, sixty federal courts had active cases
with court-appointed CDAs.106
Because there are only five CDAs working nationally,107 the DSO’s
National Litigation Support Team (NLST)108 limits the number of cases that
CDAs can work on at a time based on several factors, including (1) the
number of codefendants, (2) the volume of discovery or unusual
technological issues, (3) the geographic location of the prosecution, (4) the
timing of defense counsel’s request for CDA assistance, and (5) the CDA’s
workload.109 All factors need not be present to warrant a CDA’s assistance,
encourage early discussion of electronic discovery issues through ‘meet and confers,’ the
exchange of data in industry standard or reasonably usable formats, and resolution of disputes
without court involvement where possible.” Letter from Sean Broderick to CJA Study Comm.,
supra note 7, at 5.
101. Letter from Sean Broderick to CJA Study Comm., supra note 7, at 5. Unlike the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not contain
established procedures for handling e-discovery. Id. The ESI Protocol, therefore, is an
essential resource for federal criminal attorneys who were previously uncertain about how to
manage ESI. Id.
102. SEAN BRODERICK ET AL., supra note 35, at 4.
103. See ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9, at Introduction, Page 1.
104. Id.
105. See ESI Protocol, DEF. SERVICES OFF., https://www.fd.org/litigation-support/JointElectronic-Technology-Working-Group/esi-protocol [https://perma.cc/KEX7-3MLD] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019).
106. Letter from Sean Broderick to CJA Study Comm., supra note 7, at 6. In 2016, Russell
Aoki maintained that nearly seventy different courts had appointed him as a CDA across the
country. See Aoki Declaration, supra note 93, at 2.
107. In June 2018, the DSO announced its decision to increase the number of CDAs from
three to five to meet the demand for CDA assistance. See Memorandum from Sean Broderick,
supra note 60, at 1. The five CDAs assisting CJA counsel with managing voluminous ESI in
select federal cases are Angela Campbell, Julie de Almeida, John Ellis, Russell Aoki, and
Emma Greenwood. Id.
108. The NLST works with defense counsel to manage criminal cases with a large number
of defendants, voluminous discovery, or complicated e-discovery issues. Direct Assistance for
CJA Panel, supra note 11. The NLST also trains and educates FDO staff and CJA
practitioners on strategies for addressing ESI and methods for choosing appropriate resources
and beneficial ways of using technology in cases. Id. Finally, the NLST manages the CDAs
working nationally. Id.
109. See Coordinating Discovery Attorneys, DEF. SERVICES OFF., https://www.fd.org/
litigation-support/coordinating-discovery-attorneys [https://perma.cc/B6XL-N2E7] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019).
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and the NLST weighs the factors against the seriousness of the alleged
crime(s).110 Once an NLST administrator determines that a CDA’s support
is justified, CJA counsel must petition the court ex parte to appoint a CDA.111
4. 2012–2014: Appointing CDAs pre-Hernandez
Prior to September 12, 2014, when Judge Forrest denied the appointment
of a CDA, orders appointing CDAs did not clearly define the duties or scope
of the role. This indefiniteness may have stemmed from the ESI Protocol’s
vague guidance that, in a multidefendant federal criminal prosecution,
defendants should “seek the appointment of a [CDA] and authorize that
person to accept, on behalf of all defense counsel, the ESI discovery
produced by the government.”112 It also ambiguously states that CDAs may
“provide additional in-depth and significant hands-on assistance to CJA
panel attorneys and [federal defender organization] staff,” without defining
“in-depth” or “significant.”113 The ESI Protocol offers no further instruction
other than that “[g]enerally, the format of production should be the same for
all defendants”—mindful of defendants’ potentially divergent “needs and
interests.”114
Without defined responsibilities or restrictions, most orders between 2012
and 2014 appointed the CDA “for the defendants,” adding that the CDA’s
duties were “defined within [the] Order along with the basis for her
appointment.”115 The orders then provided the reason behind the
appointment, the allegations against the defendants, and a description of the
extensive ESI.116 Finally, the orders detailed the CDAs’ general duties:
The Coordinating Attorney shall oversee any discovery issues that are
common to all of the defendants, including the use of interpreters to
translate selected pleadings and discovery. The Coordinating Attorney
shall address discovery issues to avoid potential duplicative costs that
would be incurred if defense counsel were to employ support services or
staff to organize the discovery. The Coordinating Discovery Attorney shall
assess the most effective and cost-efficient manner in which to organize the
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See ESI PROTOCOL, supra note 9, at Strategies, Page 11. The ESI Protocol states that
defendants alternatively can authorize one or two of the attorneys of record to act as the
coordinating attorney. Id. This Note assumes, however, that the CDA is an AOUSCcontracted attorney rather than an attorney who is already appointed to represent an individual
defendant in the case.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., Order Appointing Emma M. Greenwood as Coordinating Attorney at 2,
United States v. Franco, No. 12 Cr. 932 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2013), ECF No. 48 (emphasis
added); see also Order for Appointment of Coordinating Discovery Attorney at 1, United
States v. Ortiz, No. Cr 12-0119 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2012), ECF No. 109 (“Attorney Blair
Perilman is appointed as Coordinating Discovery Attorney for the CJA defendants.”).
116. See, e.g., Order Appointing Emma M. Greenwood as Coordinating Attorney, supra
note 115, at 2 (noting allegations of “a conspiracy to distribute narcotics” and ESI that included
“a variety of scanned documents, consensually monitored telephone calls, wiretaps with
corresponding line sheets and/or transcripts, and up to eight (8) terabytes of video files”).
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discovery, utilizing methods such as the creation of a discovery index, that
will benefit all defendants. The Coordinating Attorney shall seek input
from defense counsel as to their assessment on general discovery issues.
The Government shall work with the Coordinating Attorney to provide
discovery in a timely manner . . . .117

Unlike Judge Weinstein, judges from 2012 to 2014 appointed CDAs
without mentioning potential ethical conflicts. They also failed to define the
bounds of CDAs’ responsibilities or indicate whether the defendants needed
to provide informed consent.
B. Hernandez: Why Orders to Appoint CDAs Changed
This section discusses Judge Forrest’s decision denying the appointment
of a CDA in Hernandez and confronts how her decision affected orders to
appoint CDAs moving forward. Part II.B.1 concentrates on the pretrial
conference regarding defense counsel’s motion to appoint a CDA. Part II.B.2
discusses Hernandez itself, exploring Judge Forrest’s reasons to deny the
appointment. Finally, Part II.B.3 considers defense counsel’s motion for
reconsideration and Judge Forrest’s denial of that motion.
1. Pretrial Conference Regarding Defense Counsel’s Motion to Appoint a
CDA
In United States v. Hernandez, the court convened the parties to discuss
defense counsel’s motion to appoint Emma Greenwood, a CDA, on behalf of
the nine defendants charged with participating in a narcotics conspiracy.118
During the colloquy, Judge Forrest warned that ethics issues would arise if
the CDA’s responsibilities exceeded administrative tasks, such as accepting
ESI on behalf of all defense counsel, creating a repository for the
information, ensuring that defense counsel has the necessary technical
support, controlling costs by seeking low-cost vendors, and advancing costsharing opportunities with the government.119 To the extent Ms. Greenwood
would substantively review the discovery material on behalf of the nine
different defendants, Judge Forrest theorized that Ms. Greenwood would
form nine conflicting attorney-client relationships.120 If Ms. Greenwood’s
tasks were “entirely repository-like,” however, then the court contended that
a vendor, not an attorney, should fill the role.121 The court further cautioned
that, without client consent, defense counsel could not off-load discovery
responsibilities, like verifying that all appropriate discovery material had
117. Order for Appointment of Coordinating Discovery Attorney, supra note 115, at 1; see
also Order Appointing Emma M. Greenwood as Coordinating Attorney, supra note 115, at 2;
Order to Appoint Russell M. Aoki and Emma Greenwood as Coordinating Discovery
Attorneys at 2, United States v. Sierra, No. 11 Cr. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2012), ECF No. 146.
118. Conference at 6, United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2014), ECF No. 70.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id. at 9.
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been received from the government, to another attorney: “at no time can any
of the defense counsel not have full, entire, 360-degree responsibility for all
aspects of the discovery process for their client.”122
The court also questioned how each defendant’s communications would
remain confidential.123 Assume defendant A’s attorney of record asked the
CDA to run a search to find whether A was on a particular phone call that
discussed the alleged crime or to find whether defendants B or C were more
or less involved.124 It may be, Judge Forrest suggested, that A’s attorney
would not want B’s and C’s attorneys to find out about the search and
results.125 Judge Forrest asked what protections would be put in place to
ensure these communications between the CDA and A’s attorney remained
confidential to protect the defendants’ potentially divergent interests.126
2. Judge Forrest’s Decision
Two days after the pretrial conference, Judge Forrest denied defense
counsel’s request to appoint the CDA.127 The court reasoned that there are
“obvious ethical and legal issues implicated by any court’s appointment of
an attorney to act on behalf of multiple defendants in a criminal case,” due
to, among other things, the absence of a well-defined, single list of CDAs’
Until Hernandez, no other reported decision denied the
tasks.128
appointment of a CDA. Instead, many judges expressed their appreciation
for this cost-saving and judicially efficient role.129
Because CDAs are attorneys, owing a duty of undivided loyalty to their
clients, Judge Forrest surmised that one CDA cannot manage discovery on
behalf of multiple defendants without violating this duty.130 Judge Forrest
122. Id. at 8–9.
123. See id. at 9.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
128. See id. at *2.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Vujanic, No. 3:09–CR–249–D (17), 2014 WL 3868448, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2014) (“Vujanic will have the benefit of [the CDA’s] extensive prior
experience in this case when attempting to narrow his examination of the discovery that the
government has produced.”); United States v. Sierra, No. 11 Cr. 1032 (PAE), 2012 WL
2866417, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (acknowledging “the organized and vigorous efforts
of . . . the coordinating discovery attorneys to make this discovery available to the defense
promptly and in a user-friendly fashion,” guaranteeing that the evidence was “promptly and
meaningfully reviewable by the defendants”).
130. Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *4 (“No attorney can be designated to bear [the]
responsibility [of ensuring defense counsel has access to his or her client’s full story] on behalf
of more than one defendant without a Curcio hearing . . . .” (citing United States v. Curcio,
680 F.2d 881, 887 (2d Cir. 1982))). A district court conducts a Curcio hearing to determine
whether a defendant who intends to waive conflict-free representation is both competent and
makes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Curcio, 680 F.2d at 887. To assess
the validity of a defendant’s waiver, many jurisdictions follow the Second Circuit’s
established procedure: (1) advise the defendant of his or her right to conflict-free counsel, (2)
instruct the defendant as to the dangers inherent in being represented by one attorney with

2019] ROLE OF "COORDINATING DISCOVERY ATTORNEYS"

1191

highlighted that each criminal defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to
conflict-free and effective assistance of counsel.131 She noted that this right
is so fundamental to the proper administration of the criminal justice system
that insisting on it may be necessary despite defendants’ stated preference to
be jointly represented with waived conflicts.132 The court posited that
perhaps CDAs are not expected to act as attorneys or partake in a strategic
capacity.133 In that case, the court wondered why an attorney—rather than a
third-party vendor who could avoid forming multiple attorney-client
relationships—should act as the coordinator at all.134
The court anticipated that Ms. Greenwood’s substantive involvement on
the case would lead to ethical quandaries related to conflicts of interest,
confidentiality, and competence. Judge Forrest wrote that any task related to
discovery in a criminal case could have “substantive aspects,” including: (1)
guaranteeing that discovery materials are received and loaded onto a database
for review, (2) tagging, indexing, or searching the ESI, (3) liaising with the
prosecution beyond “a ‘mail drop’ capacity,” (4) negotiating or requesting
discovery materials, and (5) “conducting substantive document review.”135
Judge Forrest acknowledged that coordinating ESI may achieve
efficiencies and free underfunded CJA-appointed counsel from replicating
administrative tasks.136 However, since each individual attorney would
otherwise perform the tasks delegated to Ms. Greenwood pursuant to defense
counsel’s motion, the court found that this role would exceed convenient
coordination.137 Moreover, because the “[h]ow, why, when, and to what
extent” each defendant participated in the alleged crimes will differ, defense
counsel must cater their review of evidence to uncover each defendant’s
unique story and ultimately strategize a unique defense.138 If one CDA is
responsible for uncovering nine different defendants’ stories, Judge Forrest
deduced, then “she will have responsibilities to all defendants at the same
time.”139 The attorneys of record cannot, therefore, delegate all substantive

divided loyalties, (3) permit the defendant to confer with chosen counsel, (4) encourage the
defendant to seek independent advice, (5) allow reasonable time for deliberation and decision,
and (6) engage in an open discussion to ensure that defendant understands the risks. See United
States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1992).
131. See Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *3 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271
(1981)).
132. See id.
133. See id. at *4.
134. See id. at *5 (emphasizing that if the reasons to seek the appointment of an attorney
rather than a nonattorney vendor are to preserve attorney-client privilege or undertake
responsibilities that require legal training, then the ethics problems concerning joint
representation remain).
135. Id. at *5–6.
136. See id. at *3–4.
137. See id. at *6.
138. See id. at *3 (“Discovery may reveal that a defendant was ‘only present’ at a particular
time; or not present at all; or heavily involved; or minimally involved; or was giving orders;
or was receiving orders; or withdrew from the conspiracy at a particular point in time.”).
139. See id. at *4.

1192

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

discovery tasks to a single attorney on behalf of all the defendants without
violating their clients’ right to conflict-free counsel.140
Finally, Judge Forrest raised a concern regarding the lawyers’
competence.141 Specifically, the court feared that the attorneys of record
would rely on the CDA’s technical expertise and inevitably inhibit their own
fluency with legal technology.142 Managing complex discovery, Judge
Forrest urged, should not become a specialized task that only few lawyers
can handle.143 Judge Forrest asserted that if judges repeatedly appointed
CDAs on multidefendant federal criminal cases, defense counsel would lose
the technological competence that the Model Rules require.144
3. Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, defense counsel attempted to quell
Judge Forrest’s concerns by reconceptualizing the CDA’s role as
nonrepresentational.145 Rather than acting as an attorney for nine defendants,
defense counsel wrote, Ms. Greenwood would provide litigation support
services to the defense team as a whole.146 In her supporting declaration,
Ms. Greenwood described her contract with the DSO, which provided that
she would manage data and document workflow, ensure the case remains on
schedule as it relates to discovery, and overcome logistical problems as they
arise.147 Ms. Greenwood’s individualized assistance, she averred, would be
limited to “evaluat[ing] each assigned lawyer’s level of computer
sophistication” as well as instituting any work product protections to
maintain privileges across defendants.148
The attorneys of record, not the CDA, would remain accountable for any
errors in the discovery process.149 Neither the DSO contract nor Ms.
Greenwood’s proposed responsibilities included giving legal advice,
strategizing with defense counsel, communicating directly with defendants,
making substantive judgments about the probative value of evidence, or
participating in any trial proceedings.150 Rather, defense counsel vowed Ms.
140. See id.; see also United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (“‘[A]
possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,’ in part because
the interests of the defendants may diverge at virtually every stage of the proceeding.” (quoting
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980))); supra note 130 and accompanying text.
141. See Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *7.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018).
145. See generally Motion for Reconsideration, United States v. Hernandez, 14 Cr. 499
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2014), ECF No. 69.
146. See id. at 2; see also Declaration at 2, United States v. Hernandez, 14 Cr. 499
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2014), ECF No. 69-1 (“As a CDA, I address global discovery matters;
matters involving individual discovery are beyond my purview as CDA and left to the client’s
respective defense counsel.”).
147. See Declaration, supra note 146, at 2.
148. See id.
149. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 145, at 5.
150. See id. at 4; see also Declaration, supra note 146, at 2.
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Greenwood would only assemble and systematize global discovery.151 This
work would include objective, but not subjective, coding and negotiating
with the government about the quantity and format of the ESI, but not its
substance or content.152 Defense counsel argued that because CDAs do not
serve defendants’ unique individual interests, but only their common
interests, no conflict of interest would arise.153 Ms. Greenwood’s role,
defense counsel analogized, is similar to a liaison attorney in a class action
or MDL: while she would help gather, organize, distribute, and review the
ESI to streamline the discovery process, she would not enter into any
attorney-client relationships.154
Regarding confidentiality, Ms. Greenwood claimed that her law degree
would only help preserve confidences.155 To help avoid breaches of
confidentiality, Ms. Greenwood maintained that she would keep annotations
and tags created by one defense attorney separate from other defense
attorneys sharing the same discovery database.156 Defense counsel affirmed
that the attorney-client privilege protects CDAs’ communications with the
defense team under the work-product doctrine since “the purpose of the
communication is to assist the attorney in rendering advice to the client.”157
With respect to competence, defense counsel stated that CDAs are
authorized to train defense attorneys on the technological complexities of
managing voluminous ESI.158 Therefore, working with Ms. Greenwood
would enable counsel to gain, not lose, technological skills and become more
familiar with how to manage ESI in future cases.159
Judge Forrest denied defense counsel’s motion for reconsideration,
however, writing that “the [c]ourt does not believe [the CDA’s
responsibilities] are categorically non-representational.”160 Defense counsel
did not persuade Judge Forrest that CDAs provide litigation support services

151. See Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 145, at 4. In another case, Mr. Aoki
described how CDAs systematize discovery. See Aoki Declaration, supra note 93, at 3. Mr.
Aoki explained that once CDAs receive and catalog the discovery, they add discovery
information into a spreadsheet, including the date, Bates numbers, defendant names, document
type, event dates, and other information allowing the attorney to find relevant material to his
or her client. See id. CDAs also hyperlink each discovery item into the spreadsheet, so that
the individual lawyers need not scan a long index and then swap in the disc containing the
relevant ESI. See id. Instead, the attorneys of record can click open the hyperlink and the
document, photograph, audio, or video file will open. See id.
152. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 145, at 7.
153. See id. at 4.
154. See id. at 5.
155. See Declaration, supra note 146, at 3.
156. Id.
157. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 145, at 7 (quoting United States v. Mejia, 655
F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)).
158. Id. at 7–8.
159. Id.; see also Declaration, supra note 146, at 3 (quoting Ms. Greenwood’s contract,
which specifies that she will “[p]rovide training and support services to the defense teams as
a group and individually”).
160. See Order at 1, United States v Hernandez, 14 Cr. 499 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014)
(denying defense counsel’s motion for reconsideration).
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as consultants rather than legal representatives or that Ms. Greenwood could
avoid conflicting duties of loyalty.161
C. Post-Hernandez: Ramifications of Judge Forrest’s Decision
Judge Forrest’s opinion affected the way defense attorneys now draft
proposed orders to appoint CDAs. Prior to Hernandez, CDAs had broader
authority to act. In Mosquera, Judge Weinstein authorized Ms. Piel to “take
such further action as will assist the court and defense counsel in expediting
the case and providing due process at the least possible cost to the
government.”162
Although Judge Weinstein also delineated more
administrative duties, such as securing space to store documents and
obtaining interpreters,163 this broad grant of authority authorized Ms. Piel to,
for example, engage in legal research, obtain court orders permitting the
defendants to listen to tapes at their respective institutions, and implore the
government, via letters and phone calls, to meet its discovery obligations.164
Judges now appoint CDAs “for defense counsel,” rather than for the
defendants themselves.165 Further, CDAs’ responsibilities remain consistent
across orders:


Managing and, unless otherwise agreed upon with the
government, distributing discovery produced by the government
and relevant third party information common to all defendants;



Assessing the amount and type of case data to determine what
types of technology should be evaluated and used so that
duplicative costs are avoided and the most efficient and costeffective methods are identified;



Acting as a liaison with federal prosecutors to ensure the timely
and effective exchange of discovery;



Identifying, evaluating, and engaging third-party vendors and
other litigation support services;



Assessing the needs of individual parties and further identifying
any additional vendor support that may be required—including
copying, scanning, forensic imaging, data processing, data
hosting, trial presentation, and other technology depending on the
nature of the case;



Identifying any additional human resources that may be needed by
the individual parties for the organization and substantive review
of information;



Providing training and support services to the defense teams as a
group and individually; and

161. See id.
162. United States v. Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. 962, 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
163. See id.
164. See Report of Coordinating Counsel to the Court, supra note 77, at *18.
165. See, e.g., Order Appointing Shazzie Naseem as Coordinating Discovery Attorney at
1, United States v. Goode, No. 16 Cr. 529 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2016), ECF No. 33.
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Assisting CJA panel attorneys in the preparation and presentation
of budgets and funding requests to the court.166

Current orders also state that CDAs do not provide representation and
therefore do not enter into attorney-client relationships with any
defendants.167 Recent case law demonstrates that CDAs act only
administratively; they consolidate and ease defense counsels’ discovery
review and assist with technology.168
Within this nonlegal scope, an e-discovery vendor or offshore consultant
likely could handle most current CDA tasks. However, there are several key
advantages to appointing a CDA: (1) the government is likely more willing
to collaborate with CDAs rather than nonattorney vendors or offshore
consultants who may not be working face-to-face with the defense team, (2)
CDAs understand defense counsels’ need to find certain kinds of discovery
material whereas vendors cater to civil litigants and are unaccustomed to
addressing concerns particular to criminal cases, (3) CDAs reduce expenses
by seeking low-cost vendors and advancing cost-sharing opportunities with
the government, (4) CDAs use their own criminal defense experience to
better understand case strategy and review techniques, and (5) CDAs
preserve attorney-client privilege.169
III. UNDERSTANDING AND RESOLVING THE ETHICS ISSUES
While courts are appointing CDAs at a growing rate, no court or legal
scholar has considered how CDAs can expand their role within the ethical
confines. As Part II of this Note explained, CDAs presently hold an
administrative role in multidefendant federal criminal trials with voluminous
ESI and do not purport to exercise legal judgment.170 Prior to Hernandez,
however, CDAs were free to act with greater responsibility.171

166. E.g., id. Some post-Hernandez orders omit the final bullet point. See, e.g., Order
Appointing Emma M. Greenwood as Coordinating Discovery Attorney at 1–2, United States
v. Valdez, 18 Cr. 71 (D.R.I. Nov. 14, 2017), ECF No. 20.
167. See, e.g., Order Appointing Emma M. Greenwood as Coordinating Discovery
Attorney at 2, United States v. Nunez, No. 17 Cr. 438 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017), ECF
No. 48.
168. See United States v. Galloway, No. 1:17-cr-01235-WJ, 2018 WL 2994409, at *4 n.2
(D.N.M. June 14, 2018) (appointing a CDA “to assist counsel in organizing the material”);
United States v. Budovsky, 13cr00368 (DLC), 2016 WL 386133, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28,
2016) (appointing a CDA “to provide technology assistance”); United States v. Martin, No.
8:12–cv–205–T–17MAP, 2015 WL 4623711, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2015) (appointing a
CDA “for the benefit of a centralized electronic database”).
169. See generally Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note 13.
170. See supra notes 150, 166, 168 and accompanying text. “A CDA’s criminal defense
attorney credentials are relevant only because they give the CDA practical experience in
handling voluminous discovery in criminal cases: many criminal defense attorneys lack such
experience, and most technology vendors deal mainly with civil litigation.” See Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 145, at 4.
171. See supra notes 81–88, 117 and accompanying text. In her 2014 decision, Judge
Forrest noted the historically “broad-ranging CDA appointments.” United States v.
Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
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Although the CDA’s role has shifted throughout the past few decades, this
Part tests Judge Forrest’s intuition—that CDAs “raise serious [ethical]
To clarify this
concerns”172—under the most robust construction.
construction’s broad scope, this Part envisions a scheme that mirrors Ms.
Piel’s assumed role in Mosquera173 and departs from the clerical, post-2014
CDA. Limited only by their discovery focus, the “unleashed” CDA can:
(1) Help with subjective coding. Objective coding is limited to tagging a
document by its date, time, sender, or recipient.174 This Note presumes that
CDAs can tag a document based on whether it might be helpful to one or
more defendants.
(2) Search discovery databases substantively. Rather than merely
searching for documents that, for example, have the word “gun,” CDAs can
help construct and run searches that will unmask more critical themes that
could inform plea or trial decisions.
(3) Offer defense counsel evidence that may help with his or her theory of
the case. While CDAs cannot propose theories of the case, the attorneys of
record may give their theory of the case to CDAs and, in return, CDAs can
locate ESI that promotes or undermines that theory.
(4) Press the government to hand over discovery and determine the
material among the voluminous ESI that pertains to each defendant.175
(5) Conduct legal research and develop discovery arguments relevant to
all the defendants. If a global issue materializes during plea negotiations or
trial, then defense counsel can seek CDA assistance.176
Some exceptions apply. CDAs cannot:
(1) Counsel individual defendants directly.
(2) Negotiate plea offers with the government.
(3) Help defense counsel strategize legal theories for individual
defendants.
(4) Present any part of the case to the court, including opening arguments,
direct or cross examinations, and summations. However, if a judge asks a

172. Hernandez, 2014 WL 4510266, at *5.
173. While Judge Weinstein imagined an administrative coordinator, Ms. Piel adopted a
more substantive role. See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text.
174. See Aoki Declaration, supra note 93, at 4.
175. Compare Report of Coordinating Counsel to the Court, supra note 77, at *5 (“Counsel
appeared to welcome a coordinating advocate and urged [Ms. Piel] to ascertain from the
government what particular evidence out of the mass of tapes and other material the
prosecution intended to offer in evidence against each of the defendants.”), with Order
Appointing Shazzie Naseem as Coordinating Discovery Attorney, supra note 165, at 2
(“Discovery issues specific to any particular defendant shall be addressed by defense counsel
directly with the Government and not through the Coordinating Discovery Attorney.”).
176. Again, Ms. Piel’s role provides guidance. Report of Coordinating Counsel to the
Court, supra note 77, at *14 (“I assisted in the research in developing the legal arguments
which we hoped would persuade the Court. Each counsel was requested to write up what
might be pertinent to his/her own case concerning the justification for a downward
modification.”); see also supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
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CDA for a discovery status report or to answer questions in open court about
the case, the CDA should be permitted to answer.177
This scope assumes CDAs can also still perform the administrative duties
set out in orders post-2014.178
Part III concludes that courts should not hesitate to appoint CDAs under
the most robust scheme. Even if ethics issues arise from CDAs acting with
greater authority, they are surmountable. Part III.A explains limited-scope
arrangements and lays out how CDAs’ limited scope enables them to perform
legal work for codefendants without violating the Model Rules. Part III.B
describes potential conflicts of interest that may emerge but concludes that
they will rarely arise and are waivable. Part III.C evaluates how CDAs can
ethically maintain codefendants’ confidences. Finally, Part III.D argues that
CDAs’ assistance will not reduce other defense attorneys’ technological
competence.
A. Scope of Representation
Model Rule 1.2(c) permits lawyers to limit the scope of their
representation “if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and
the client gives informed consent.”179 This ethical principle is not
controversial, as “virtually all legal representations are limited in scope to
some degree.”180 Encouraging limited-scope representations enables private
lawyers to work in a more efficient legal services market and public interest
lawyers to increase low-income persons’ access to legal services.181
177. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. If CDAs only supplied administrative
services that nonlawyers also could provide—“law-related services”—CDAs would not be
burdened by the Model Rules, so long as they made their nonrepresentational role clear to the
defendants. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
(explaining that the Model Rules apply “unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures to assure
that the recipient of the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and
that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not apply”). While Model Rule 5.7
uses several examples, including accounting, lobbying, economic analysis, and tax
preparation, to illustrate law-related services, CDAs’ administrative tasks, such as document
management and litigation support services, clearly fall within the law-related services
umbrella. See id. r. 5.7 cmt. 9; see also Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World
of Legal Services?: The Ethical and Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related
Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 401, 404 (2007); Hugh D. Spitzer, Model Rule 5.7 and Lawyers
in Government Jobs—How Can They Ever Be “Non-Lawyers”?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45,
47 (2017). This Part assumes, however, that CDAs’ duties exceed law-related services and,
therefore, explores the applicable Model Rules governing lawyer-client relationships.
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c). The ABA defines “informed consent”
as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” Id. r. 1.0(e).
180. Susan D. Carle, The Settlement Problem in Public Interest Law, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 14 (2018) (“Lawyers and clients together define the scope of the legal problem or
problems they intend for the lawyer to address, and lawyers then typically draft a provision
defining the scope of the representation being undertaken, which they include in the retainer
agreement they offer the client.”).
181. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE: A
REPORT
OF
THE
MODEST
MEANS
TASK
FORCE
4
(2003),
https://
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Limited-scope arrangements, or “unbundled” legal services, are used, for
example, to execute discrete transactions182 or to aid low-income civil
clients—without the right to counsel—in both housing183 and family law
settings.184 From motion practice to discovery, judges have begun
employing limited-scope arrangements in their courtrooms to control
litigation costs and expedite solutions.185
While Model Rule 1.2(c) gives lawyers “substantial latitude” to form
limited-scope relationships, “the limitation must be reasonable under the
circumstances.”186 If a client requests general information or advice about a
straightforward legal issue, for instance, the lawyer and client may agree to
limit the representation to a brief telephone conversation, so long as the call
is “sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely.”187 Further,
limited scope does not mean limited competence; lawyers still have a duty to
provide competent representation,188 as well as comport with all other ethics
rules, like loyalty and confidentiality.189
Examples of limited-scope arrangements in other settings demonstrate
how CDAs can ethically limit the scope of their representations. In the
corporate context, clients regularly separate a single transaction into discrete
tasks, instructing different lawyers to perform independent segments of the
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_scl
aid_handbook_on_limited_scope_legal_assistance.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
T7QZ-245X]; see also ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS.,
RESOLUTION WITH REPORT NO. 108, at 44 (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/ls_del_unbundling_resolution_108.a
uthcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL69-UQUU] (“[T]he American Bar Association
encourages practitioners, when appropriate, to consider limiting the scope of their
representation, including the unbundling of legal services as a means of increasing access to
legal services.”).
182. See, e.g., In re Slabbinck, 482 B.R. 576, 589 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012) (holding that
an agreement to limit an attorney’s legal services in connection with an individual bankruptcy
case by unbundling the pre- and postpetition legal services is ethically permissible).
183. See James G. Mandilk, Note, Attorney for the Day: Measuring the Efficacy of InCourt Limited-Scope Representation, 127 YALE L.J. 1828, 1840–48 (2018) (describing several
legal aid organizations that provide unbundled legal services in housing cases).
184. See Michele N. Struffolino, Limited Scope Not Limited Competence: Skills Needed to
Provide Increased Access to Justice Through Unbundled Legal Services in DomesticRelations Matters, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 159, 168 (2014) (“Domestic-relations attorneys
routinely limit the scope of their services to review a mediated divorce agreement without
being obliged to advocate for a better resolution or to do further investigation.”).
185. See, e.g., Morris A. Ratner, Restraining Lawyers: From “Cases” to “Tasks,” 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2151, 2151 (2017) (underscoring the new “judicial management” trend,
which involves transforming “cases” into “tasks” as “the most efficient route to a resolution”).
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
187. Id.
188. Id. For a limited-scope representation to be competent, the lawyer (1) must “render
practical service to the client” and (2) “may not materially impair the client’s rights.” N.Y.
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 604 (1989), https://
www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5349 [https://perma.cc/4XPG-NPGR].
189. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 330 (2004), https://www.dcbar.org/barresources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion330.cfm [https://perma.cc/4UMC-EQDT] (affirming
that limited scope arrangements are ethically sound unless they “sweep away the applicable
rules of professional conduct”).
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transaction.190 In lieu of one full-service lawyer, a corporate client may ask
lawyer A to conduct due diligence, lawyer B to advise on the transaction’s
tax implications, lawyer C to counsel on financing matters, and lawyer D to
prepare the legal documents.191 The ABA recognizes that unbundling
enables clients to meet their preferences and retain experts in specific areas
of the law, while reducing the transaction’s overall costs.192
In the litigation context, lawyers similarly limit the scope of their
representations to discrete tasks.193 For example, a lawyer who is primarily
responsible for a matter but not admitted to that matter’s jurisdiction—lead
counsel—will commonly seek support from local counsel.194 Although the
designation of “local counsel” does not on its own “limit the attorney’s role”
or “narrow her ethical obligations to the client,” she “may circumscribe her
role by entering into an agreement to limit the scope of representation”
pursuant to Model Rule 1.2.195 If the circumscription is reasonable and the
client provides informed consent,196 then local counsel’s ethical obligations,
including diligence, competence, and confidentiality, only apply to the
specified tasks agreed to at the outset of the representation.197 Suppose, as
the New York City Bar Association (NYCBA) did, that lead counsel asks
local counsel “to review the legal analysis in a summary judgment motion
prepared by lead counsel, but to assume that the factual recitations are
accurate.”198 The NYCBA concluded that such a limitation is reasonable and
that local counsel’s ethical obligations only extend to reviewing the legal
arguments.199
Notably, limited-scope representations are not confined to scenarios where
multiple lawyers represent one client. Rather, it is routine for one lawyer to
represent multiple parties under a limited-scope arrangement. Several
individuals interested in creating a business entity or joint venture, for
190. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 181, at 5.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 6.
193. See Bruce A. Green, The Right to Two Criminal Defense Lawyers, 69 MERCER L. REV.
675, 677 (2018) (“[T]wo solo practitioners may join forces on a large matter, or a lawyer
conducting most of the representation independently may bring another lawyer into the matter
for a discrete task, such as to draft motions or to consult on an issue where the second lawyer
has particular expertise.”); Stephen C. Sieberson, Two Lawyers, One Client, and the Duty to
Communicate: A Gap in Rules 1.2 and 1.4, 11 U.N.H. L. REV. 27, 30 (2013) (recognizing that
one lawyer often engages a second lawyer as cocounsel “to share responsibility . . . in a matter
because of its size or complexity”).
194. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2015-4 (2015), https://
www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072917-FormalOpinion2015-4DutiesofLocal
Counsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/R29Q-38CQ] [hereinafter Opinion 2015-4].
195. Id.
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
197. Opinion 2015-4, supra note 194, at 2 (“A written agreement that clearly limits the role
of local counsel can benefit all parties by managing expectations, avoiding misunderstandings
about the scope of the lawyer’s responsibilities, minimizing disputes over the allocation of
responsibility between lead counsel and local counsel, and managing costs.”).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 4. The NYCBA stressed, however, that local counsel “may not ignore obvious
factual inaccuracies contained in the motion papers.” Id.
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instance, may seek one lawyer’s assistance for the sole purpose of drafting
the agreement’s terms.200 This limited-scope lawyer is sometimes called a
“scrivener,” charged with preparing the agreement according to
prenegotiated terms, “making it legally understandable and enforceable by
all.”201 Although the scrivener may “identify structural flaws in the
negotiated terms that might interfere with the smooth operation of the
transaction,” she may not advise on or propose terms that may benefit one
party over another.202 Similarly, several states’ bars have opined that
representing both the buyer and seller (or lender and borrower) in a
noncomplex real estate transaction is ethically permissible, so long as the
parties previously agreed to standard contract terms, such as “price, time and
manner of payment.”203 The Massachusetts Bar Association maintained that
a lawyer who receives the informed consent of both the lender and borrower
can “obvious[ly]” represent both parties competently “in connection with
such limited duties.”204 Such a limitation provides clients with “economic
and professional benefits,” including reduced legal costs and “representation
by a lawyer with expertise in real estate and with familiarity with the
borrower-client’s purchase of real estate and the lender-client’s policies
and procedures.”205
Comparable advantages result in the criminal context where CDAs
supplement, but not substitute, full-service counsel’s representation.
Because CJA-appointed counsel and public defenders often lack the
resources, time, and skill to cull discovery, defendants receive more effective
representation when CDAs provided additional discovery assistance.206
CDAs also cut costs by streamlining the work that multiple defense attorneys
otherwise have to do themselves.207
CDAs’ limited-scope duties only serve to enhance the defendants’
representation. In fact, because CDAs “have experience working on CJA
200. See, e.g., Henry Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representation Model:
Moderating Power Disparity, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1274–75 (2003); Gretchen L. Jankowski,
Comment, The Ethics Involved in Representing Multiple Parties in a Business Transaction:
How to Avoid Being Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis Within the Confines of the
Maryland Disciplinary Rules, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 179, 203 (1993).
201. Ordower, supra note 200, at 1275.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 611 (1990),
https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5622 [https://perma.cc/TM337VEJ]; see also Mass. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 90-3 (1990), https://www.massbar.org/
publications/ethics-opinions/ethics-opinions-1990-opinion-no-90-3 [https://perma.cc/VD966L8B] [hereinafter Opinion 90-3] (holding that an attorney may represent both the borrower
and lender in a real estate purchase “provided the attorney has carefully reviewed the loan
documents and found no apparent unresolved disqualifying conflicts between the interests of
the borrower and the lender and if the attorney has obtained the informed consent of both
borrower and lender after full disclosure”).
204. Opinion 90-3, supra note 203.
205. Id.
206. Letter from Sean Broderick to CJA Study Comm., supra note 7, at 2 (explaining that
the “disparity of resources” between CJA-appointed counsel and the DOJ, including money,
personnel, and training “often overshadows all other problems for federal CJA practitioners”).
207. Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note 13, at 4.
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cases and are knowledgeable about . . . [how] to manage discovery in federal
criminal litigation,” they are uniquely qualified to provide competent
representation in the limited scope of discovery.208 Even under the most
robust scheme, so long as each defendant understands the CDA’s role,
consents to the limited scope, and receives competent representation from the
CDA, then Rule 1.2(c) is satisfied.209 Because CDAs represent more than
one defendant in a limited scope, however, other potential ethics issues arise,
such as conflicts of interest and confidentiality. Parts III.B and III.C explore
these issues.
B. Conflicts of Interest
The Model Rules provide that a lawyer cannot concurrently represent
multiple clients if the representation would involve a conflict of interest.210
Specifically, Model Rule 1.7(a) prohibits representations that (1) are directly
adverse or (2) present a “significant risk” that the lawyer’s responsibilities to
one client “will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client.”211 Despite a conflict, Model Rule 1.7(b) allows a lawyer to
undertake a joint representation, provided that (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes she can competently and diligently represent coclients and (2) each
client provides informed consent in writing.212
Although there almost always will be conflicts between coclients, those
conflicts do not always prohibit joint representation.213 For instance, a
lawyer may, with informed consent, concurrently represent two or more
clients seeking to form a joint venture, even though the lawyer may not be
able to “recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take
because of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others.”214 Similarly, a lawyer
may represent coplaintiffs in a securities action where the coclients have

208. See Memorandum from Theodore Lidz, Assistant Dir., Off. of Def. Servs., to Judges
& Clerks, U.S. Dist. Court 1 (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.miefdo.org/forms/
Services_of_Coordinating_Discovery_Attorneys.pdf [https://perma.cc/K36N-H4VA].
209. Cf. In re Samad, 51 A.3d 486, 497 (D.C. 2012) (observing that any limit on the scope
of an attorney’s services, even if memorialized in a retainer agreement, must be explained to
the client to ensure the delineated scope is clearly understood).
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
211. Id. r. 1.7(a).
212. Id. r. 1.7(b). Before each client can provide informed consent, a conflicted lawyer
must communicate “the nature of the conflict of interest in such detail so that [the multiple
clients] can understand the reasons why it may be desirable for each to have independent
counsel, with undivided loyalty to the interests of each of them.” Unified Sewerage Agency
v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1346 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting In re Boivin, 533 P.2d 171 (Or.
1975)); see also IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 282 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[F]ull and effective
disclosure of all the relevant facts must be made and brought home to the prospective client.”).
213. “[I]nformed consent . . . is effective with respect to most conflicts of interest.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8. In the nonlitigation context,
“common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even
though there is some difference in interest among them.” Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 28.
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“knowledge of a possible conflict of interest” and nevertheless “reaffirm their
desire” to be jointly represented.215
In a criminal matter, however, representing codefendants presents thorny
ethical consequences. The ABA has warned that the potential conflicts are
“so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline” to represent criminal
codefendants in the same case.216 Since codefendants almost never share the
same legal interests, when one full-fledged lawyer concurrently represents
several defendants, “a minefield of potential conflicts” arise.217 From
indictment and plea negotiations to trial and sentencing, conflicts of interest
may materialize at each stage due to “either factual antagonism[s] or more
subtle differences that an . . . attorney might exploit in comparing and
contrasting the individual codefendants.”218 Because these conflicts often
jeopardize fair and loyal representation, district courts have “substantial
latitude” to refuse defendants’ conflict waivers.219
While one full-service lawyer’s joint representation of codefendants
clearly engenders “grave” ethical conflicts, there is only a minimal,
conjectural risk that a limited-scope CDA would create loyalty issues. Judge
Forrest exaggerated the risk in Hernandez.220 Although she questioned how
appointing a CDA “to manage discovery on behalf of multiple defendants . . .
square[s] with th[e] duty” of undivided loyalty, she did not attempt to answer
her own inquiry by exploring how the ethics rules apply.221 Instead, Judge
Forrest simply denied the appointment, resolving that the CDA cannot
ethically “have responsibilities to all defendants at the same time.”222
Even when CDAs act with broader authority than Judge Forrest
contemplated, the traditional concerns with joint representation in criminal
215. Como v. Commerce Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 335, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding joint
representation of plaintiffs in a securities action proper where the defendants argued that one
of the plaintiffs, rather than the defendants, was responsible for the injuries to the group); see
also Hamilton v. Merrill Lynch, 645 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (same). In the litigation
context, representation of coparties is permitted if there is no “substantial discrepancy” among
positions, testimony, or settlement expectations. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7
cmt. 23.
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 23. “The right to effective
representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount in the proper
administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases take precedence over all other
considerations, including the expressed preference of the defendants concerned and their
attorney.” United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J.,
concurring); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 486 n.8 (1978).
217. United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
218. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple
Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV.
211, 273 (1982).
219. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988); see also United States v. Cain,
671 F.3d 271, 294 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Combs, 222 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1991).
220. See generally United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
221. See id. at *4.
222. Id.
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cases are not present. CDAs do not appear in court on behalf of any single
defendant, counsel defendants directly, make strategic decisions, crossexamine witnesses, or advise on or negotiate plea agreements.223 These
exclusions remove significant areas of adversity.224 CDAs never present
evidence to the court that may benefit one codefendant and harm others.225
CDAs also do not make closing statements or argue during sentencing that,
for example, defendant X is more blameworthy than defendant Y.226 Finally,
because the attorneys of record are responsible both for direct and crossexamining witnesses and for negotiating with prosecutors regarding potential
plea offers, CDAs avoid the “untenable” position that arises when one
defendant is offered “a reduced charge, immunity or even a dismissal, in
exchange for testimony against the remaining defendants or other
cooperation with the government.”227
Although the risks that Judge Forrest was intuitively concerned about228
are not present here, it is useful to explore the possibility that CDAs’
discovery obligations to one defendant may “materially limit[]” their
obligations to the other defendants.229 Consider the following hypothetical:
five defendants—Company A (A) and corporate officers Brad (B), Charlie
(C), Drew (D), and Eden (E)—are charged with fraud for inflating expenses
in their contracts with the government. The defendants’ lead attorneys ask
the CDA to review the evidence, directing her to search for ESI that may be
223. Such conduct would veer dangerously into conflict-ridden territory. See, e.g., Peter
W. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J.
1075, 1078–80 (1979) (describing various conflicts that arise when one lawyer jointly
represents two defendants in a criminal matter, including deciding which, if any, defendant
should testify during trial and how to formulate a closing argument that benefits multiple
defendants simultaneously).
224. The NYCBA has acknowledged that “not all joint representations involve conflicts of
interest requiring ‘informed consent’ pursuant to Rule 1.7.” N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2017-7 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/
files/2017299-2017-7-Joint_Client_Opinion_PROFETHICS_12.12.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AG5S-QQX5] [hereinafter Opinion 2017-7]. Particularly in a transactional setting, “the
positions and interests of the joint clients may be aligned so closely and/or the scope of the
representation may be so limited that a lawyer’s representation of any one of them is unlikely
to be adversely affected by the representation of the other(s).” Id.
225. Cf. Parker v. Parratt, 662 F.2d 479, 484 (8th Cir. 1981) (“A conflict of interest exists
where the factual circumstances require counsel to offer evidence which assists one
codefendant but adversely affects others.”); Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979, 983–84 (7th Cir.
1980); United States v. Kranzthor, 614 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1980).
226. Cf. Moore, supra note 218, at 274 (“When a lawyer represents only one of several
defendants, in closing arguments he may stress favorable comparisons between his client and
the other defendants. When a single attorney represents all the defendants, however, he must
approach comparisons among the defendants with the greatest caution.”).
227. Id. at 273–74 (quoting Y. KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 124 (5th
ed. 1980)). When an attorney represents multiple defendants and one codefendant decides to
cooperate and testify against the remaining defendant(s), an often-disqualifying conflict
emerges. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 688 F. Supp. 373, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(disqualifying defendant Sanders’s attorney, Lassar, since he had previously represented a
codefendant during the grand jury investigation who stated he might cooperate with the
government and testify against Sanders).
228. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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helpful or hurtful to their clients’ cases. While reviewing the discovery
materials, the CDA comes across an email that ostensibly exculpates B and
inculpates A, C, D, and E. The email is from C to D and has E copied on the
email. It forwards a fraudulent expense report and reads, “When we discuss
this contract, let’s keep B out of the loop.” Although the CDA will not decide
how to use the evidence during trial, she must determine who should get the
evidence. If she does not give the evidence to any of the defendants, or gives
the evidence only to defendants A, C, D, and E, defendant B may feel
betrayed; unless B’s lead attorney locates this same email separately, B
would presumably miss exculpatory information. On the other hand, if the
CDA gives the email only to defendant B, defendants A, C, D, and E may
feel neglected as they will be unable to determine how to minimize the
email’s significance. Similarly, defendants A, C, D, and E may deem the
CDA disloyal if she gives the email to all five defendants since defendant B
could then assert his innocence by pointing the finger at the rest.
Although this scenario presents a potential conflict, it is not clear that it
triggers Rule 1.7’s “significant risk” qualification.230 Even if it does,
however, the attorneys of record can overcome the risk by devising ground
rules to govern the CDA’s work and ask the defendants to consent. The
ground rule should establish that the CDA will provide all the discovery
materials to all the defendants, and then the defendants, with their individual
counsel, can decide the utility of the evidence. This ground rule would enable
the CDA to review and share the evidence without appearing disloyal to one
or more defendants.
Such a ground rule is certainly consentable.231 To establish proper consent
in the context of a CDA’s joint—yet limited-scope—representation, each
codefendant must understand the ground rule’s “possible effects on loyalty,
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, and the advantages and risks
involved.”232 As independent, unconflicted counsel, the attorneys of record
can address the implications of the ground rule before obtaining the
defendants’ informed consent.233 Specifically, the attorneys can explain both
the benefits of proceeding jointly with the CDA’s help, including a more
thorough and efficient review of the facts, and the potential risks, including
230. Unlike the hypothetical lawyer described in Comment 8 to Rule 1.7, CDAs are not
expected to “recommend or advocate all possible positions,” or for that matter, advocate any
position. See id. r. 1.7 cmt. 8; see also supra note 212 and accompanying text.
231. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 31 (“The lawyer should, at the
outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s
informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will
have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should
be kept from the other.”).
232. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 18. “The more comprehensive the explanation of the . . . actual and
reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of th[e] representation[], the greater the
likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding.” ABA Standing Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_05_436.pdf
[https://perma.cc/85DW-SYRW].
233. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22.
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feeling undermined when the CDA distributes evidence that damages one
codefendant and benefits another.
After explaining the advantages and disadvantages and receiving the
defendants’ consent, the attorneys of record can represent to the court that
the defendants understand the potential conflicts and voluntary waive
them.234 Because each defendant has counsel independent from the CDA, a
district court likely would validate the waivers.235 Only when a client has
given a waiver that is likely to undermine his own goal should a court
overturn the waiver on competency grounds without undermining the client’s
autonomy.236 It is doubtful that a CDA’s supplementary assistance would
ever undermine a defendant’s goals.
Assuming that there is no conflict of interest among codefendants, the
Model Rules still require a lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation” before obtaining the client’s consent.237
“Because the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to each jointly represented client
generally prohibits the lawyer from continuing the representation while
withholding, as between the clients, information material to the
representation,”238 the attorneys of record must clarify how the group plans
to handle discovery material and explain alternatives before getting
consent.239 Furthermore, even if there is no apparent conflict of interest at
the outset of the litigation, the attorneys of record must vigilantly monitor
conflicts throughout the representation.240 If one of the defendants decides,
for instance, that he does not want the CDA to share a piece of evidence that
is uncovered, then the CDA may have to withdraw from representing that
client.241

234. Judge Forrest asserted that only a Curcio hearing could resolve whether a defendant
made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of conflicts. See United States v.
Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014); see
also supra note 130 and accompanying text. However, because the attorneys of record can
separately advise each defendant on the dangers of the potential conflict and make impartial
representations to the court, scheduling Curcio hearings and appointing independent counsel
to advise each defendant would be both burdensome and unnecessary.
235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (“[C]onsent is more likely to be
effective . . . if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving
consent . . . .”).
236. Kevin H. Michels, What Conflicts Can Be Waived?: A Unified Understanding of
Competence and Consent, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 109, 155–56 (2012).
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (addressing communications between a
lawyer and client).
238. See Opinion 2017-7, supra note 224.
239. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4).
240. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (“Even if a client has validly consented to waive further conflicts,
however, the lawyer must reassess the propriety of the adverse concurrent representation under
paragraph (b) when an actual conflict arises.”).
241. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2019-4 (2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2019529-Pool_Counsel_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7AN-4T49] [hereinafter Opinion 2019-4].
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The CDAs’ other proposed duties, including subjective coding, pressing
the government for Brady 242 material, and legal research on discovery issues
common to all defendants, will not engender other conflicts. A CDA can
easily maintain neutrality due to the role’s limited scope243 and because the
attorney will have nothing to gain by vindicating one defendant’s interests
over another.
C. Confidentiality
Model Rule 1.6 establishes that an attorney may not, without informed
consent, reveal any information relating to the client’s representation.244
Especially in the criminal defense context, this “rule of secrecy” is one of the
most important ethical obligations; it incentivizes defendants to fully and
frankly disclose information—whether favorable or damaging—trusting that
counsel will use that information only to mount the best defense possible.245
If a lawyer represents multiple clients, however, this duty to maintain each
client’s confidentiality “may conflict with the obligation of disclosure to
each.”246
Even when CDAs act with broad authority, they do not meet with
defendants individually to discuss the indictment, hear their stories, or
counsel them. At least directly, the defendants only will confide in their
attorneys of record. Within their limited scope, however, CDAs will
inevitably learn of confidential information about multiple defendants and
have to balance their commitments to both confidentiality and
communication. Responding to counsels’ requests to find probative
documents, for instance, requires insight into the defendants’ secrets.247
242. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
243. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2001-3 (2001),
https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/
detail/formal-opinion-2001-3-limiting-the-scope-of-an-attorneys-representation-to-avoidclient-conflicts [https://perma.cc/88T6-94BU] (finding that a lawyer may limit the scope of
representation to resolve a conflict of interest “[w]here the portion of the engagement to be
carved out is discrete”).
244. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(“The confidences communicated by a client to his attorney must remain inviolate for all time
if the public is to have reverence for the law and confidence in its guardians.”); see also ABA
Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-450 (2008) [hereinafter
Opinion 08-450] (“Among a lawyer’s foremost professional responsibilities are fidelity to a
client and preservation of the client’s confidence with respect to ‘information related to the
representation’ . . . .” (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6)).
246. Opinion 08-450, supra note 245. Model Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to “keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter . . . to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4; see also supra note 237 and accompanying text.
247. Cf. Gordon v. Kaleida Health, No. 08-CV-3785(F), 2013 WL 2250506, at *9
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (finding that rules of presumed confidential communications
between client and attorney do not apply to client-nonattorney e-discovery vendor
relationships, where the vendor provides paper document scanning and objective coding
services, neither of which requires the coder to review or evaluate the document’s probative
value).
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Imagine a ten-defendant, gang-related murder case where the attorneys of
record share their clients’ stories and strategies for the case with the CDA to
generate the most relevant search results during the review process. In doing
so, the CDA learns from defendant X’s counsel that X confessed to his
involvement and indicated that the government likely possesses text
messages inculpating him and defendants Y and Z in the events but
exculpating the rest of the defendants. Presumably, the CDA would violate
her duty of confidentiality to X if she discloses X’s confession to the other
counsel but violates her duty to keep Y, Z, and the rest of the defendants
“reasonably informed about the status of the matter,” if she conceals it from
the rest.248 Absent defendants’ agreement, a lawyer in this position
ordinarily must withdraw to eliminate the conflict.249
Establishing a “no secrets” ground rule—where information disclosed by
X may be shared with the rest of the defendants—can overcome this ethical
quandary.250 So long as CDAs obtain each defendant’s informed consent,
this solution does not foreclose appointing CDAs in multidefendant criminal
trials.251 To obtain informed consent, the attorneys of record must explain
the risks and benefits of a “no secrets” model, where private communications
shared with the CDA may be disclosed to the other codefendants on the
case.252 In a sense, the CDA acts as an agent of a joint defense team,
coordinating and managing an open discovery platform for the entire group.
If defendants agree at the outset to share all information with each other,
expressly waiving confidentiality, then defendant X in the example above
will not feel wronged when the CDA reveals the confession or the text
messages to the remaining defendants.253
248. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4.
249. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 327 (2005),
https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion327.cfm [https://perma.cc/
T2SY-YLTS] [hereinafter Opinion 327].
250. See Opinion 08-450, supra note 245 (“Clarifying expectations at the onset of the
representation is always preferable . . . and may affect the ability of the lawyer to continue
representing one or the other client after difficulties arise.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Fairness and candor
between the co-clients and with the lawyer generally preclude[] the lawyer from keeping
information secret from any one of them . . . .”).
251. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a); see also id. r. 1.0(e).
252. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 555 (1984),
https://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=7471 [https://perma.cc/7Q8UUY3U] [hereinafter Opinion 555] (“Lawyer may not disclose to one joint client confidential
communications from other joint client relating to the subject matter of the representation,
absent express or implied consent . . . .”); see also Opinion 08-450, supra note 245 (“Absent
an express agreement among the lawyer and the clients that satisfies the ‘informed consent’
standard of Rule 1.6(a) . . . the lawyer is prohibited by Rule 1.6 from revealing that
information to any person . . . .”).
253. See, e.g., Opinion 327, supra note 249 (“Because the disclosing client previously has
waived confidentiality, there is nothing to weigh against either the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to
the non-disclosing client or the lawyer’s obligation to keep that client reasonably informed of
anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client’s interests.”). As explained
above in Part III.B, since the defendants have their own counsel to advise on any theoretical
risks, a court likely will accept that each defendant who consents to the agreement is informed.
See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
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After the defendants consent to the CDA’s appointment under these terms,
the attorneys of record must monitor the representation to ensure the
agreement passes muster as the representation continues.254 Imagine that
defendant X consents to a “no secrets” rule when the CDA is first
appointed.255 Later, defendant X’s attorney tells the CDA about X’s
confession, information that defendants Y and Z need to know, but X now
insists that the information not be disclosed to Y and Z.256 Here, the CDA
“may have an unconsentable conflict that requires withdrawing from the
representation of one or [many] clients.”257 The speculative risk that a CDA
would have to withdraw from representing one defendant in a multidefendant
criminal trial, however, should not prohibit or limit the role more generally.
Moreover, the common disadvantages associated with sharing
information, usually in a joint defense arrangement, are not present here.
Ordinarily, when confidences are unprotected, codefendants may not feel
comfortable divulging their secrets.258 Knowing that a fellow codefendant
might withdraw from the group and cooperate as a government witness often
creates a skeptical and guarded environment.259 Moreover, defendants may
remain quiet and avoid blaming the kingpin for fear of retaliation,
embarrassment, or stricter punishment.260 However, in this context, the
attorneys of record can protect each defendant from revealing information
that would frustrate their defense strategy. As a filter between the defendants
and the CDA, the attorneys of record can ensure that confidences only be
shared with the CDA if, in their reasoned opinion, such a disclosure would
benefit their client. Because CDAs never counsel the defendants directly,
defendants would never lose secrecy entirely.
Furthermore, defendants stand to gain significant advantages from sharing
information, including a more exhaustive review of the evidence and lower
costs.261 Coordinating discovery efforts gives the defendants the best means
to challenge the prosecution’s resources and evidentiary advantage.262 Of
course, each defendant must understand the risk that certain disclosures may
damage his case compared to the other codefendants. Nonetheless, CDAs’
work will help defendants gain greater insight into the prosecution’s strategy
and build a stronger defense. This ground rule also protects CDAs from
254. See Opinion 2019-4, supra note 241.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. Bartel, supra note 53, at 877.
259. See, e.g., id.
260. Cf. Nahrstadt & Rogers, supra note 54, at 30–31 (describing that one significant
drawback to joint defense agreements is that the major defendants tend to control the defense
“to protect their large stake in the case,” thereby disadvantaging the less involved defendants).
261. See id. at 30; see also Opinion 2019-4, supra note 241 (“An arrangement in which
prospective clients give informed consent to the lawyer’s use of confidential information,
learned while representing them for the mutual benefit of all the pool clients, furthers one of
the principal advantages to the clients of concurrent representation—that is, the lawyer’s
ability to draw on a greater depth of knowledge based on the aggregation of information from
the multiple clients to the benefit of all the representations.”).
262. Nahrstadt & Rogers, supra note 54, at 30.
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breaking either their confidentiality or communication obligation and
prevents the potential discomfort from maintaining codefendants’
confidences.
Many bar associations have approved this “no secrets” scheme in other
multiple-client settings.263 In Ethics Opinion 555, the New York State Bar
Association (NYSBA) considered whether a lawyer who is jointly
representing clients A and B in their partnership affairs, and receives a
confidential communication from A that he is actively breaching the
partnership agreement with B, can disclose that communication to B.264
While the NYSBA answered the question in the negative, it concluded that
if partners A and B had knowingly consented to nonconfidentiality at the
outset, the answer would be different: although “joint employment is not
sufficient, without more, to justify implying such consent where disclosure
of the communication to the other joint client would obviously be detrimental
to the communicating client,” the attorney can condition “joint representation
upon the clients’ agreement that all communications from one . . . may be
disclosed to the other.”265
Similarly, in Formal Opinion 2019-4, the NYCBA determined that one
lawyer, often referred to as “pool counsel,” may simultaneously represent
multiple individuals as witnesses or potential witnesses in a governmental or
corporate internal investigation.266 Because “[t]he ordinary expectations
regarding confidentiality in an individual representation cannot be
maintained in a pool representation,” the NYCBA outlined guidelines that
pool counsel should use to address confidentiality issues among multiple
clients. The opinion’s recommendations align with this Note’s proposal:
each client must understand “the lawyer’s obligations regarding confidential
client information and must secure the prospective client’s informed consent
regarding how confidential information will be handled.”267 Specifically, the
NYCBA stated that pool counsel must obtain informed consent not only to
use information learned from every client to benefit all the representations
263. See, e.g., Opinion 327, supra note 249 (“Where one client has given consent to the
disclosure of confidential information by the lawyer to another client,” the lawyer must reveal
the secret “if the information is relevant or material to the lawyer’s representation of the other
client.”); Opinion 555, supra note 252; cf. Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 95-4 (1997),
https://www.floridabar.org/etopinions/etopinion-95-4/
[https://perma.cc/T94Q-K6BN]
(finding that lawyers should discuss ethical obligations with regard to confidentiality prior to
joint representation of husband and wife in estate planning to avoid confidentiality and
disclosure conflicts).
264. Opinion 555, supra note 252.
265. Id.
266. See generally Opinion 2019-4, supra note 241. Although pool counsels’
responsibilities, including preparing clients for questioning by corporate or government
counsel and negotiating the terms of each client’s interview and/or testimony, are more
comprehensive than CDAs’ duties in multidefendant criminal trials, similar ethics issues
apply. See id. The biggest difference between pool counsel and CDAs is that pool counsel
typically represent multiple individuals concurrently but separately, whereas CDAs normally
represent the discovery interests of “‘joint clients’ who coordinate legal strategy.” See id.
(emphasis added).
267. See id.
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but also to disclose pool clients’ confidential communications.268 As the
“presumptive understanding in a joint representation,” the NYCBA offered
the “no secrets” approach as one way to handle confidential
communications.269 Under this framework, the opinion maintains, the clients
can all agree that “confidential information disclosed to the lawyer may be
disclosed to all other concurrently represented clients at the lawyer’s
discretion, unless and until the disclosing client revokes this
authorization.”270
If confidentiality dilemmas can be overcome in other joint representation
contexts, such as corporate and estate planning matters, CDAs should
similarly be able to jointly represent codefendants if ground rules are set at
the start.
D. Competence
Pursuant to Model Rule 1.1, lawyers have a nondelegable duty to act
competently.271 This rule requires lawyers to act with “the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”272 In response to the rapid impact technology has had on the
practice of law, the ABA amended this rule in 2012, adding that a competent
lawyer should “keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”273 In this digital
age, an attorney’s technological incompetence can lead to serious
consequences for the client, as well as disciplinary sanctions against the
lawyer.274
In Hernandez, Judge Forrest worried that the attorneys of record would
rely on the CDA’s technical expertise and inevitably inhibit their own fluency

268. See id.
269. Id.; see also N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2016-2 (2016),
https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20073141-2016-2_Representing_Witness_Solely
_for_Deposition_7_7_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/E66K-FTKU] (“Among joint clients, there is
a presumption that confidential information that is material to the joint representation will be
shared among the joint clients, unless some exception applies.”).
270. Opinion 2019-4, supra note 241.
271. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
272. Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 8.
273. Id. The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20’s chief reporter claimed that the ABA
wrote this comment in a purposefully vague manner, leaving room for new technologies bound
to arise in the future. See Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First Century Lawyer’s Evolving
Ethical Duty of Competence, PROF. LAW., Oct. 2014, at 24, 25 (“[T]he specific skills lawyers
will need in the decades ahead are difficult to imagine.”); see also Jamie J. Baker, Beyond the
Information Age: The Duty of Technology Competence in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S.C. L.
REV. 557, 560 (2018).
274. See, e.g., HM Elecs., Inc. v. R.F. Techs., Inc., No. 12cv2884–BAS–MDD, 2015 WL
4714908, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (sanctioning a civil practitioner for his failure to
issue a litigation hold, learn about the structure of his client’s ESI, advise his client on the
proper methodology for searching ESI and monitoring compliance, and, finally, for failing to
supervise the attorneys to whom data preservation and litigation hold duties were delegated),
vacated in part, 2016 WL 1267385 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016).
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with legal technology.275 Managing complex discovery, Judge Forrest
warned, should not become “an unduly specialized task” that only few
lawyers can handle.276 The court surmised that if CDAs were routinely
appointed in multidefendant CJA cases, defense counsel would lose the
technological competence that the Model Rules require.277 These concerns
are overstated.
First, the Model Rules recognize that lawyers can retain or contract with
other lawyers to provide or assist in the provision of legal services to the
client.278 So long as the lawyer obtains informed consent from the client and
reasonably believes that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the
competent and ethical representation of the client, then delegating discovery
tasks to another lawyer is acceptable.279 In Formal Opinion 08-451, the ABA
specifically authorized lawyers to outsource discovery tasks to other lawyers,
either in the United States or abroad.280 Outsourcing can range from
photocopying for document productions to developing legal strategies and
preparing motion papers.281 Provided that the outsourcing lawyer’s services
to the client and delegated tasks are performed competently, then “[t]here is
nothing unethical about” outsourcing.282 Delegating discovery tasks to
CDAs in multidefendant criminal cases is analogous to the outsourcing
scenarios described in Formal Opinion 08-451, including hiring a document
management company to create and oversee a discovery database for
complex litigation.283 Outsourcing and delegating discovery tasks to CDAs
share similar goals, such as reducing costs and increasing the quality of legal
assistance.284 Similar to a small firm that may be unable to regularly employ
the lawyers and legal assistants required to handle a large, discoveryintensive litigation, court-appointed defense lawyers, often single
practitioners, lack the infrastructural support to review evidence thoroughly
and cost-effectively.285
Second, time-honored case law has recognized that “the complexities of
modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients’ affairs
without the help of others.”286 In United States v. Kovel,287 a lawyer
representing a client accused of federal income tax violations hired an
275. See United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
276. Id.
277. See id.
278. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
279. See id.
280. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/pdfs/ethicsopinion08451
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VRJ-6VGF].
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. See id.; see also Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note
13, at 3–4.
285. See Garrie & Gelb, supra note 8, at 402.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
287. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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accountant to listen to the client’s story and then help the lawyer analyze the
complex accounting and tax issues.288 In rendering its decision that the
attorney-client privilege extended to the nonlawyer accountant, the Second
Circuit acknowledged that law is highly specialized and lawyers cannot be
expected to understand every concept relevant to a client’s case.289 To
provide competent representation to their clients, lawyers who lack a
specialty in a particular field should seek assistance from experts, both
lawyers and nonlawyers.290
Third, while discovery is a concept that all lawyers must understand to be
competent—unlike accounting, which understandably may be “a foreign
language to some lawyers”291—keeping abreast of technological changes
does not restrict lawyers from seeking outside assistance during the discovery
process.292 Legal practitioners understand that “[l]awyers who lack their
own competence in e-discovery may associate with other lawyers with the
necessary expertise.”293 Unlike Judge Forrest, who speculated that
associating with CDAs would cause the other defense lawyers to “‘lose the
thread’ of how to handle and manage electronic discovery,”294 most judges
encourage such association.295 In a Title VII action involving voluminous
and complex ESI, Judge Andrew J. Peck, a magistrate judge for the Southern
District of New York, wrote: “[e]ven where . . . counsel is very familiar with
ESI issues, it is very helpful to have the parties’ ediscovery vendors (or inhouse IT personnel or in-house ediscovery counsel) present at court
conferences where ESI issues are being discussed.”296
Fourth, CDA assistance does not stymie defense counsel’s required
comprehension, since CDAs are empowered to train defense attorneys on the
technological complexities of managing voluminous ESI.297 As a result,
attorneys of record gain, rather than lose, new technological skills and
techniques to manage ESI moving forward.298 Even assuming CDAs fail to
impart their knowledge, the attorneys of record presumably work on other
single-defendant or civil cases where e-discovery tasks are just as important.
Since managing ESI is not unique to multidefendant criminal cases, CDAs
288. See id. at 919.
289. Id.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 922.
292. See Monica McCarroll, Discovery and the Duty of Competence, 26 REGENT U. L. REV.
81, 107 (2014) (“While competent practitioners must stay abreast of these changes, they also
must recognize the need to rely on experts in these areas not only to understand the technology
but to ensure that their adversary and the court understand and accept it as well.”); Ettari &
Hertz-Bunzl, supra note 30.
293. Ettari & Hertz-Bunzl, supra note 30.
294. United States v. Hernandez, No. 14 Cr. 499 (KBF), 2014 WL 4510266, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014).
295. See, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), adopted
No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP), 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012).
296. Id.
297. See Letter from Russell M. Aoki to Hon. Kathleen Cardone, supra note 13, at 3.
298. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 145, at 7–8; see also Declaration, supra note
146, at 3.
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do not breed incompetence. In fact, because CDAs’ duties allow defense
attorneys to concentrate on the facts and legal issues of the case rather than
the duplicative and often tedious tasks involved in discovery, CDAs boost
defense counsels’ competence.299
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, legal representations have become increasingly
complex. To provide effective and competent representation, lawyers are
now required to understand far beyond the trial basics. In the context of ESI
and discovery, lawyers are presumed to bear the expense of either selfeducating or hiring someone, like a third-party vendor, to perform technical
parts of the representation beyond arguing in court. In cases with voluminous
ESI, lawyers may pool their resources and coordinate efforts to ensure an
expedient resolution. One example of such coordination is court-appointed
CDAs.
As demonstrated by the continued motions to appoint CDAs in criminal
cases and NLST’s decision to hire two more CDAs in 2018, defense lawyers
have perceived CDAs as a helpful resource in managing multidefendant
criminal cases with complex ESI. Because CDAs are lawyers, rather than
nonattorney vendors, CDAs’ assistance on multidefendant criminal trials
implicates the professional conduct rules. One district court’s concerns about
CDAs’ ethical consequences, however, should not restrict this role’s
potential reach.
This Note concludes that CDAs can be lawyers for multiple defendants
within the limited scope of discovery. In addition to their administrative
tasks, CDAs should be able to engage in substantive coding, press the
prosecution for Brady material, help defense counsel locate key documents
to bolster their trial strategy, and conduct legal research related to discovery
that is relevant to all defendants.
Courts, and the legal market more generally, have already welcomed the
unbundling of legal work from “cases” to “tasks” through limited-scope
representations. As long as defendants understand and consent to the limited
scope of the CDA’s work, CDAs fit this unbundling model and can act
ethically for the defense group’s benefit. Furthermore, at the outset of the
representation, defendants can agree that the CDA will share evidence among
the codefendants equally to avoid prejudicing one defendant over another.
Defendants also can agree to a “no secrets” ground rule, such that the CDA
can disclose one defendant’s confidential information to another defendant if
the information bears on the latter defendant’s representation. Because each
defendant has his or her own counsel to advise on the risks and benefits of
the CDA’s limited scope, the potential conflicts of interest, and
confidentiality issues, defendants can provide informed consent before a
CDA is appointed. The attorneys of record must monitor a CDA’s
representation to ensure no conflicts arise, and a CDA must withdraw from
299. See generally Aoki Declaration, supra note 93.
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one or more representations if a nonconsentable conflict surfaces. Judicial
appointment and proper oversight will ensure that both consent and conflict
waivers are effective and that a CDA’s assistance is consistent with due
process throughout.
Under this Note’s robust scheme, CDAs bring clear benefits to
multidefendant federal criminal trials. As Judge Weinstein anticipated,
CDAs help protect defendants’ rights, enhance productivity, expedite the
proceedings, and lower costs for the court. Achieving efficiencies in criminal
trials through limited-scope lawyering is no less important now than it was
in 1993. Similar to the appointment of lead and liaison counsel in class
actions or MDL, CDAs streamline multidefendant criminal cases “without
jeopardizing fairness to the parties.”300 With proper safeguards, CDAs with
broad authority not only can conform to the Model Rules’ norms but they
can improve representation of codefendants in multidefendant federal
criminal cases.

300. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 10.221.

